Book Review: Luke Harding's "Collusion"

The Steele dossier. A formerly unknown document commissioned first by Republican benefactors during the early stages of the 2016 campaign and then by Democrats concerning any weaknesses in the Donald Trump candidacy, it surfaced into the mainstream media with the FBI's investigation of the current Republican president's potential collusion with Russia. Named after the former MI6-spy-turned-private-contractor Christopher Steele, it was a product of years of intelligence gathering starting in the 1980s first by various Western spy agencies and then by Steele's non-state spying company Fusion GPS. And it sure stirred up the hornet's nest of American politics. Former Guardian journalist Luke Harding's 2017 book Collusion: Secret Meetings, Dirty Money, and How Russia Helped Donald Trump Win explores the events contained in the dossier in a chronological fashion in an attempt to separate the fake news from the real facts as they are understood.

Since this book necessarily scratches an iceberg, it is not definitive proof by any means (stay tuned for the outcome of the Mueller investigation), but the substantial circumstantial evidence provided nonetheless makes for a compelling narrative right out of a spy thriller. In other words, Trump and members of his campaign made direct and indirect contact with Russia fairly often, enough to cause suspicion among actors like Steele that the Russian spy agency, the KGB, was trying to "cultivate" U.S. targets in order to provide information in a broader mission to undercut Western solidarity (Harding, 2017, p. 169). However, they weren't looking for just any contacts. Harding brings up a Soviet document from 1984 that outlines a new strategy of recruiting people that were greedy, vain, prone to flattery and adultery (and so on), as a big source of traditional leftist oriented subjects had dried up with the dissolution of the USSR. (Dare I say it, but does this sound familiar?)

Our story begins when Donald Trump marries in 1977 to his first wife, Ivana, a native of the former Soviet satellite state Czechoslovakia. Believing they had found an ideal subject to cultivate, the Russians then in 1987 apparently used a pretext of a potential Moscow real-estate development by the Trump company to bring him state-side. However, this transaction, like potential future formal business proposals between Trump associates and Russian business entities, did not go past the "potential" stage. Yet, Steele traces multiple instances of Russian money filtered through offshore tax havens and banks around the world targeted towards Trump-connected business entities while subtle nudges were being made to convince Trump to get involved in a potential presidential run by a series of intermediaries, like Englishman Rob Goldstone, Paul Manafort, Wilbur Ross, Russian oligarch Aras Agalarov and Russian lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya (to name a few of the major players; the dizzying web of characters presented in this narrative is somewhat overwhelming). These intermediaries soon extended into Trump's close family like Trump Jr. and son-in-law Jared Kushner, who all were being subtly played by the offer of so-called opposition research into Hillary Clinton in exchange for making premature foreign policy promises (like the rescinding of the 2012 Magnitsky Act, which imposed new sanctions on Russia because of new and flagrant human rights violations). Meanwhile, American divisions were being stoked by social media and conspiracy news sites somewhat backed by Russian cyber actors during the 2016 election.

And the rest is history, as they say. Except it's no doubt also the present, as we are all now only catching up with this semi-hidden history contained in the Steele dossier. Then candidate Trump has now ascended to the American presidency, which is one of the most powerful positions in the world (but also vulnerable, if Russian or other foreign entities have compromised it). His first year in office has been tumultuous, to say the least, rife with infighting among the various wings of the Republican party and against Democrats not keen on helping him further his legislative agenda (which has then been mirrored by similar divisions between most of the American public, allowing openings from various (national and international) groups seeking to sow more hate and division). The Charlottesville episode immediately comes to mind, exposing the dark undercurrent of present-day American society. At further risk of distancing too much from the central story of Collusion, an investigation was opened in the midst of this tumultuous year, first by former FBI director James Comey (fired by Trump) and taken up by special counsel Robert Mueller. And so, the book comes full circle from its opening chapter to its concluding one.

While some of the links between Russian and the Western players in this narrative are tentative (i.e. indirect contacts like business relationships that are not necessarily illegal) and some actors have questioned the credibility of the Steele dossier (Fusion GPS after all does espionage work for many paying clients), Harding forces readers to at least stop and think about the whole Trump-Russia business. At the very least, Trump was unwise to get caught up in the seedy underworld of Russian espionage. At the very worst, Trump was making a deal with the devil in order to aid his election bid. (As I said before, the Mueller investigation should be allowed to run its course before any definitive conclusions are made). In any case, the potential for the president (and indirectly the public) to be compromised in any way by any foreign actors should give all Americans pause, no matter their political orientation or background.

Works Cited:

Harding, Luke. (2017). Collusion: Secret Meetings, Dirty Money, and How Russia Helped Donald Trump Win. New York: Vintage Books.

On the State of the Union: The Democratic Implications of Different News Narratives

{The third in a series of case studies on media and democracy.}

The State of the Union address is an opportunity for a President to outline his or her policy agenda for their upcoming term for a huge national audience whereby taking advantage of the media’s officialdom bias especially centered around the White House (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 4; OPS, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). The media devoted considerable coverage to President Obama’s State of the Union address in 2011, including before, during, and after the event took place, producing multiple narrative frames around what was essentially another chapter in an ongoing political drama stoked by President Obama’s release to his supporters of a video previewing his main points for the State of the Union address (OPS, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). I will analyze the development (informational and otherwise) of news coverage via examination of 12 articles before and after the President’s 2011 State of the Union address and their various biases from the perspectives of two media sources of different ideological leanings or “drifts” that had a considerable impact on a journalist’s particular selections of information from the speech transcript: six articles from the conservative FOX News outlet and six from the liberal-leaning New York Times (Bennett, 2007; Pol 304 Lectures; Rojecki, 2008). To conclude, I will elaborate on the implications of my findings for the informational needs of democracy and audience expectations towards media going forward.

I will begin with a compare and contrast analysis of the “preview” (before the speech) articles that FOX and the New York Times presented in terms of their narrative development and degree of bias, and concluding the developmental analysis with an explicit look at the informational value of the 12 articles. It is worth noting that these news outlets had access to a limited preview of the State of the Union address according to official sources via President Obama’s preview address video to his supporters, notwithstanding rumors of a potential leak of the speech transcript beforehand (the latter I will address in more detail later). Based off of this common source of information, the news organizations presented largely different narrative frames from the outset as they sought to predict what in particular the President would highlight in his address to the nation (Bennett, 2007, p. 231-234, 252-253; Pol 304 Lectures). Often enough, this selectivity in narratives could be tied to the ideological drift of the news outlet, in which the narrative content closely mirrors that of the target audience’s attitudes and beliefs (Pol 304 Lectures).

Starting with FOX News, the narrative focus from the outset was that the President was going to address primarily economic concerns, boiled down simplistically to the title of one of the preview articles as “Obama Gets Second Chance to Stress Jobs Focus at State of the Union” with concurrent chorusing of a statistic across all three preview articles regarding how the public was expectant of the President to do something to address the 9% national unemployment rate (Berger, 2011, p.1). The FOX News articles also went further by stressing the behind-the-scenes and public political charades regarding the State of the Union, noting sarcastically in the second paragraph of the latter article that this year’s address was “take 2,” essentially implying a huge lack of trust in the president’s policy priorities and leadership in relation to issues of economic concern (Berger, 2011, p. 1). Surreptitious Obama campaign operations setting up shop in Chicago were first highlighted here in the preview articles in lieu of political maneuvers (i.e. the speech being nothing more than an Obama re-election campaign ad in tougher times for him and his party) and continues more strongly in the “after” coverage (FOX, 2011).

Yet another sub-theme was developed under the political charades narrative in which the Supreme Court (primarily Chief Justice John Robert’s and Justice Antonin Scalia’s declining to attend the State of the Union address) was portrayed as almost disgusted at having to contribute to what Roberts called a very partisan “political pep rally” and what Scalia was quoted as saying, a “juvenile spectacle” that the justices (comprising what was supposed to be a politically neutral and independent branch of government) should not give legitimacy to by attending (Ross, 2011, p. 1-3). Although FOX News leaned more heavily on the political showmanship component in their narratives along with primarily economic concerns, the New York Times also manifested similar skepticism, hinting that President Obama’s motives for emphasizing or including particular issues and policy priorities in his State of the Union address would primarily serve in effect to bolster his re-election campaign’s chances (FOX, 2011; NY Times, 2011).

Moreover, FOX seemed to rebuke the President for his false bipartisan symbolism by recalling Obama’s 2010 State of the Union address in which for Obama called out the court in regards to the 2010 Citizens United decision (which allowed greater election campaign spending by such entities as corporations), noting that the President was going to use the address similarly this time around as merely a tool for his partisan policy agenda (Ross, 2011, p. 1-3; NY Times, 2011). In other words, the President’s symbolic gathering of the three branches of government for his speech along with promotion of across-the aisle mingling in the wake of the events in Tucson was seen by FOX as a partisan façade, with the ideological leanings of FOX amplifying the traditional adversarial tendencies of reporting in this case by playing up conflict between the President, the Supreme Court, and both political parties indirectly for the obligation to ensure truly civil and bipartisan deliberation in democratic decision-making (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 6; Ross, 2011, p. 1-3).

An illustration of the latter idea is shown in the FOX article “Obama’s Economic Agenda: Boost U.S. Competiveness” in the following line: “Heading quickly into reelection mode, Obama is expected to use Tuesday’s prime-time speech to promote spending on innovation while also promising to reduce the national debt and cooperate with emboldened Republicans” (FOX & AP, 2011, p. 1). Heavy also throughout the tone and language of these preview articles from FOX was a notably strong use of the authority disorder bias, essentially juxtaposing the President as under political heat from both the Republicans and the frustrated electorate to demonstrate leadership on the economy, including bipartisan compromises with Republicans in Congress to address the country’s (potentially cataclysmic, as the articles implied especially in regards to the national debt) economic problems swiftly in the post-recession era (FOX & AP, 2011, p.1). Essentially, in the FOX news articles, the public at large is portrayed more as an angry, frustrated collective demanding greater accountability and prioritization of their issues (i.e. jobs) from the government, and thus putting the political onus on the President to either lead the country out of economic disaster (whereby through convincing the public of the truth of his centrist, bipartisan image) or fail, leading to a cataclysm of sorts for the nation’s future (FOX, 2011). There were also implications of a divide in his own party, with rumblings of dissent over the President’s seeming turn away from party principles (such as the consideration of tax cuts for businesses) (FOX, 2011). This cataclysm and disaster angle applied, to a lesser degree, to foreign policy, with the first mentions towards the bottom of the first preview article:

“The Afghanistan war, the global threat of terrorism, the repeal of "don't ask, don't tell," border security and other topics are also ripe for discussion in Obama's speech. In a plus for the president, the audience is making an overt effort to be tame and bipartisan, with several lawmakers so far agreeing to sit with a member of the opposite party on Tuesday.” (Berger, 2011, p. 1)
The fact that this brief foreign policy mention got into the article seems to me to demonstrate both the journalistic tendencies towards dramatization and personalization, but also the fact that the foreign policy information that often gets through the media is sensationalized and focused on personalized examples that miss the overall context, despite a journalistic tenet that warns against sensationalism in reporting (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 6; Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 113-125). I also thought the implications of a frustrated collective public reflected the journalists’ frustration at “not getting the whole story” from the official sources they depend upon for their reporting, no matter the ideological drift (Pol 304 Lectures). This is further reflected in the New York Times pieces, albeit more implicitly, in the portrayal of the President as only just another player in the 2012 reelection game, but nevertheless, the journalists grudgingly acknowledge, a seemingly more successful one when it comes to favorably using the media for one’s agenda (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 4; NY Times, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures).

Meanwhile, the New York Times preview articles, while showing hints of ritualistic journalistic adversarialism, focus their prediction narratives for what the President will highlight in his address on a more bipartisan angle, emphasizing that President Obama will be more likely to highlight a more “centrist agenda” in the wake of the Tucson, Arizona shooting, having an obligation similar to what a Washington Times news article covering the President’s speech after the latter event as being under an obligation as leader to be a  “healer in chief” and as general unifier of the nation towards a brighter future (with similar undertones of authority disorder bias, although not as stinging as the Washington Time’s language) (NY Times, 2011; Washington Times, 2011, p. 1). While bipartisanship in the wake of the Tucson shooting was used primarily as the FOX news preview articles’ frames in accompaniment with the authority disorder bias stressing the President’s need to lead on addressing economic concerns (in the midst of a re-election campaign year no less and with the Supreme Court portrayed almost as in revolt against the President’s charades), the New York Times generally regarded the President’s message of bipartisan compromise more neutrally in the article “Obama to Press Centrist Agenda in His Address”  (Calmes & Zeleny, 2011, p. 1-4; Ross, 2011, p. 1-3). Although, similar skepticism was articulated in the New York Times by painting the President’s actions as mere political calculation (“political rebranding” to win over marginalized independents and wary business advocates) for 2012 farther down on the second page after the opening paragraph used glowing language such as “winning the future” and “national unity and renewal” (Calmes & Zeleny, 2011, p. 1-2).

Continuing on with the predicting narratives in the first three New York Times articles, the journalists primarily continued to explore themes of bipartisanship and collegiality that the FOX News articles generally played down in favor of an economic focus narrative for the address, implying that the President would use the speech primarily to bridge the partisan divides in the wake of Tucson and downplay economic concerns such as deficit reduction in favor of “investment promotion” in areas of social policy such as education and infrastructure (Calmes & Zeleny, 2011, p. 2-4). This implication towards predicting an emphasis on the bipartisan and social investment was further highlighted in the article “As State of the Union Nears, Congress Plays Musical Chairs” that tended to lean towards “soft news” content with very little information about the policy the President plans to emphasize in his State of the Union address (Graber, 2011, p. 113-125; Steinhauer & Hulse, 2011, p. 1-3). Instead, the reporter favors a soft news angle of highlighting Congressional members similarly to celebrities in the coverage of their misadventures in ways that further emphasize the distance between them and the public (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 1 & 2; Graber, 2011, p. 113-125; Steinhauer & Hulse, 2011, p. 1-3). The first paragraph contained language like “BFFs” and “asking out” to imply an almost gossip-like frame from the open, with the second paragraph emblematic of the “soft news” characterization (as laid out by Baum in “How Soft News Brings Policy Issues to the Inattentive Public” and Bennett in Chapter 1) (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 1; Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 113-125):

“The talk in the West Wing may center on what President Obama plans to say on Tuesday in his State of the Union address to Congress about the still-ailing economy, or United States-China relations, or his education agenda. But here on Capitol Hill, the talk for the last few days has been all about the seating for the president’s speech and just who will be next to whom.” (Steinhauer & Hulse, 2011, p. 1)

However, the political charades narrative comes in towards the very end of the article in which ritual adversarialism is on display again more prominently in the last New York Times preview article before the speech (“Senate Republicans to Oppose Obama’s Spending Plans”) in which the bipartisanship predictions (which even the New York Times regards skeptically) for the address are juxtaposed against a Republican-dominated Congress that is hinted to be obstructionist, in particular the Republicans that claim Tea-Party Caucus membership (Berger & NY Times, 2011, p. 1). In terms of officialdom bias, the journalist chose in this article to primarily use the quotes from high-ranking Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell, in which he “seemed at times gleefully sardonic” about the President’s attempts to appeal to a wider, more business-oriented side of the political spectrum in order to achieve his policy goals, implying that he was politically wounded after the 2010 Congressional election (in which Republicans gained majorities in Congress) that was essentially forcing him to compromise (Berger, 2011, p. 1-3). The latter, of course, McConnell implied, was because the public had protested whereby it issued a “massive restraining order against government spending and excessive debt” (Berger, 2011, p. 1). Other minor narrative angles present across all three articles include a prediction of a possible stronger focus on social issues like the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and the Tucson shooting in terms of gun control politics in the address as framed in the larger narrative about promoting national unity and healing in a partisan era, and a general dismissal of national security or foreign policy issues (NY Times, 2011).

Of course, while the President tended to focus on all of the narrative predictions of the six preview articles from FOX News and the New York Times, journalists from both organizations did not have their primary expectations necessarily verified or prioritized (OPS, 2011). In the speech itself, President Obama starts off highlighting the need for national unity (politically and otherwise) in the wake of the Tucson shooting (OPS, 2011, p. 1). Appeals to the American Dream and American exceptionalism are made immediately after as a transition point into a larger focus about achieving economic success, in which the President bases sub-proposals of investments in education, social policy, infrastructure, research, information technology, and clean energy (to name a few) in order to achieve a “Sputnik moment” for America (otherwise invoking the language of competition and competitive advantage in which America can take the lead in the 21st century) (OPS, 2011, p. 1-9). Foreign policy matters, which FOX seemed to highlight as matters that were going to be relevant in the speech as well (again reflecting the niche audience that FOX is trying to appeal to versus a more liberal audience for the New York Times), were touched briefly upon in the end as part of an overture of nationalism and bipartisanship, in which the United States was portrayed, per an American exceptionalist view, a partner for spreading democratic government and prosperity worldwide in various regions (Bennett, 2007, p. 251-254; Berger, 2011; OPS, 2011; Rojecki, 2008).

Now, we turn to an analysis of the development of the “after” news stories from both FOX News and the New York Times in which many of their primary narrative predictions were not necessarily completely verified. Starting against with FOX News, all three articles did not acknowledge that the President did not primarily focus on economics (albeit through an angle of investment vs. spending, the latter of which conservative officials generally denounced in the preview articles), but instead rationalized that relative failure in narrative predictions by doubling down primarily on the theme of the State of the Union address as a short term maneuver in a larger sequence of political charades and showmanship by the President in the last two articles (FOX, 2011). Interestingly enough (although not surprising considering the back-burner it was put on in the prediction articles) foreign policy was not even mentioned in “after” articles in favor of clamping down on the political charade narrative largely focused around domestic economic policy (FOX, 2011). The first of the three articles in the aftermath of the State of the Union address started off with the title “GOP Urge Obama to Join in Cutting Spending” in which there is a reversion to the debt cataclysm angle, but in overall language seemed to acknowledge a victory of sorts in that the President seemed to acknowledged GOP economic concerns in his speech (FOX and AP, 2011, p. 1-3). Seeming to sense a political advantage, the journalist incorporates this kind of generic political fight narrative (wins versus losses between characters from both sides) into the selection of quotes from the opening about Paul Ryan’s delivering of the official GOP response to the President’s address (FOX & AP, 2011).

However, while featuring the obligatory quotes from officialdom, the journalist also juxtaposes Paul Ryan as a controversial figure in his party (even as he is considered fiscally conservative), wanting to privatize Social Security and Medicare programs in his larger “Roadmap for America” plan to tackle the national debt (Bennett, 2007; FOX News & AP, 2011, p. 1; Pol 304 Lectures). The journalist leans heavier on the authority disorder and dramatization biases by portraying Ryan as a potential weakness in the party, a sign of internal divides that the President and his party can exploit: “Ryan’s plan…is so politically toxic that GOP campaign operatives urged candidates to shy away from it. Democrats went on the attack as soon as they heard Ryan was to deliver Tuesday’s GOP response” (FOX News & AP, 2011, p. 1-2). The last two post-address articles by FOX that I analyzed, however, again featured a cynical political charades angle that was continually reinforced (FOX, 2011). Interestingly enough, the “dance” idea between journalists and politicians was very evident in the last article, “Lights, Camera, Action for the State of the Union” in which the contentious symbiotic relationship between journalists and politicians portrayed on the national stage for the President’s State of the Union address was termed a “complicated ballet” and a “hallowed ritual” that constrained both sides in terms of their roles in the political system (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 4-6; Pergram, 2011, p. 1; Pol 304 Lectures).

Furthermore, a media hierarchy was noted based on assigned positions for media outlets in Statuary Hall, in which the media present there “move in like the Mongol Horde” to compete for post-speech reaction by officials (Pergram, 2011, p. 4). This seeming disdain for the journalists seems to reflect journalists’ frustration by the constraints placed on them by wary political actors they depend on for stories (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 5 & 6; Pol 304 Lectures). This piece, while not being informative on policy, seems more to be a fluff piece (produced by the journalist and media company under pressure from a 24/7 news cycle that fill the corresponding news “hole”) that describes the behind-the-scenes preparation for the first page, before continuing to mock the political staging by focusing the last few pages on the bipartisan musical-chairs narrative that both the New York Times and FOX News preview articles focused on (Bennett, 2007; FOX, 2011; NY Times, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). Randomly inserted bits of obscure rules against reserving seats in the Congressional chamber where the President spoke did not help either to establish a critical grounding context for the reader (Bennett, 2007; Pergram, 2011, p. 1-5).

Meanwhile, the New York Times “after” articles similarly did not have their predictions necessarily completely verified by the President’s speech, which seemed mostly to highlight economic concerns in equal amounts with occasional mentions of bipartisanship sprinkled throughout the patriotic narrative (NY Times, 2011; OPS, 2011; p. 1-9). Their ultimate sub-focus of their bipartisanship prediction narrative, the Tucson shootings, was mentioned merely early on in the speech as a segway into his five “pillars” (policy areas) of investment (such as education and infrastructure) that involved the need for bargaining and consensus (NY Times, 2011; OPS, 2011, p. 1-9). However, the New York Times journalists, with their first article post-speech (“TWO G.O.P. Responses Point to Potential Fault Lines”) instead merely alters the developmental narrative of bipartisanship (with a skeptical undercurrent as to the authenticity or actual practice of such an idea) and hints of political showmanship (from both sides) pre-2012 and chooses to revert to the traditional political conflict, personalization, authority-disorder and drama biases in which the slight liberal drift of the paper contributed to the highlighting of dueling factions in the Republican Party (mainstream represented by Paul Ryan vs. Tea Party represented by Michelle Bachmann) that Democrats could take advantage of (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; Zeleny & NY Times, 2011). This reversion to traditional informational biases and the political charades narrative essentially is a non-acknowledgment on the part of the news organization of the fallibility of their predictions (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; Pol 304 Lectures).

The latter characters cast in this narrative both gave responses to the President’s speech, with the Tea Party faction painted as rebel-like, threatening the leadership positions and unity of the Republican Party (represented here primarily by Paul Ryan) going into the 2012 elections (Zeleny & NY Times, 2011). The passage towards the bottom of the first page was especially notable in terms of journalistic selection in that the media coverage of Bachmann’s remarks seemed to usurp that of Ryan’s, which “privately angered several leading Republicans [and] highlighted the potential fissures inside the party as the Republicans face the challenges of governing in a time of severe budget constraints” (Pol 304 Lectures; Zeleny & NY Times, 2011, p. 1). This fissure narrative was hinted at again in the FOX News post-speech articles as well, highlighting the way that informational biases common to all journalists can be spun in remarkably similar ways despite different “ideological drifts” as a symptom of increased catering to niche audiences (Bennett, 2007, p. 25-28, 252-254; FOX, 2011; NY Times, 2011).

The next to last New York Times article (“Full Presidential Speech Got an Unscripted Leak”) made a one-eighty back to the political charades narrative that dominated coverage from both organizations especially in the aftermath coverage (Peters & NY Times, 2011 p. 1). The language was overtly bitter and sarcastic compared to previous coverage, with the journalist commenting that the politician-press scripted “dance” seemed to be thrown off balance with a leak of speech excerpts by the National Journal before the President was set to deliver it, juxtaposing National Journal’s head Ron Fournier (a journalistic veteran) against the President (and larger symbolism of political stagecraft) (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 4-6; Peters, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). Journalists almost seemed in this article to crow about a strike against the restraints put on them by political actors (who are aware of the adversarial nature of journalism) in terms of staged events, as portrayed in the sardonic language in the opening line: “For a White House that prides itself on being fairly leak-free, this one had to hurt” (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 5 & 6; Peters, 2011, p. 1-2; Pol 304 Lectures). At the end, bitter competition between organizations was put on display as well (Bennett, 2007; Peters, 2011, p. 2).

While the second to last article can be categorized under the theme umbrella of political stagecraft, the last New York Times article published after the speech (“Setting Stage for Clash of Ideals over Government’s Role”) merely revisited the classic political conflict narrative, with typical Republican vs. Democrat fare in terms of fiscal politics, seeming to recover well from the last article that seemed more a covert journalistic protest (Peters, 2011; Sanger, 2011, p. 1-3). The President of course was the primary player featured in the heavy authority-disorder bias and conflict narrative, facing questions about his leadership post-recession in terms of moving the country away from an isolationist stance (a formidable challenge as acknowledged at the bottom of the last page) and his plans for long term-investment and short-term cuts contrasting sharply with the Republican vision of cutting taxes and scaling back government (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; Sanger, 2011, p. 1-3). However, this article seemed to not be overtly ideologically biased towards either side with skepticism towards Republicans vented in the fourth paragraph with the idea of competitiveness achieved in the above strategy of tax cuts as an unclear “Rorschach test,” and equally vented towards Democrats whereby the President “tried [i.e. struggled]…to differentiate between his short term tactics to get the country working again” in the face of a (portrayed) skeptical public wary of the process (i.e. stagecraft) (Peters, 2011, p. 1-3). The public also seemed wary of his strategy, which was implied as recycled from his 2008 election campaign (Peters, 2011, p. 2). To one person reading this essentially, it seemed that the country was at the forefront of a battle (a symptom of a larger political conflict) in which the audience should stay tuned to see whether the President’s leadership pulls the country out of a sure impending disaster (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; Peters, 2011, p. 1-3).

Between the competing narratives and sub-narratives throughout the twelve articles from both FOX News and the New York Times (which ultimately presented a confusing, fragmented picture), what understanding could a reader glean from the coverage of the contexts of the State of the Union and the various domestic and policy issues brought up by the President in the State of the Union address? In other words, was the informational value of the articles adequate for the needs of democracy or otherwise reflecting the tastes of a so-called “inert” audience (Pol 304 Lectures)? I will attempt in this section to glean some insights into what these articles mean for the larger political journalistic system and democracy itself, beginning with the news coverage from FOX.

What informational insights were provided about the contexts surrounding the State of the Union in FOX News’ coverage? I will provide an overview of my thoughts as to the informational content of both the FOX and New York Times articles, before analyzing these findings against readings about the defining characteristics of “soft” versus informational-rich “hard” news (Bennett, 2007, p. 21-24; Graber & Baum, 2011). Because of selection bias first and foremost combined with the ideological drift of the news organization, the audience was first lead in the preview articles to believe that the State of the Union primarily would focus on the President’s attempts to lead the country out of certain economic disaster and be in general an Obama re-election campaign ad on the taxpayer’s dime (FOX, 2011). Recall the concept of summarization bias (imposed by the time pressures of a 24/7 news system and an audience which necessitated an easier communication code via simplified language and narratives) that goes hand in hand with selection and ideological biases (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; Pol 304 Lectures). From the outset, this simplified language as product of the above biases produced a strong “us vs. them” and “good vs. evil” fight between Democrats and Republicans (the latter of which were portrayed as the majority public against a President seeming to go against their will in terms of policy prioritization) (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; FOX, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). The most informational substance from the preview articles comes from the article speculating on the attendance of Supreme Court justices (with disagreement over whether attendance at the partisan State of the Union would signal a fundamental shift from the Court’s supposedly non-partisan nature), in which President Obama criticized a 2010 ruling of the Court’s in Citizens United (although the court case name was not explicitly mentioned) (FOX, 2011).

In summary, the reader comes out with a fragmented understanding despite the common source material from the White House Office of the Press Secretary, in which the President is under fire politically from members of his own party, Republicans are portrayed as trying to right the ship of the country, and the public is increasingly angry at a time when manufacturing jobs are going overseas and the unemployment rate is at 9% (FOX, 2011; OPS, 2011). As Andrew Rojecki’s Piece “Rhetorical Alchemy: American Exceptionalism and the War on Terror” demonstrated, journalists have the power in stories attempting to sway public opinion to make the public overestimate support for an opinion (such as that most Americans are concerned with the President’s economic leadership) (FOX, 2011; Graber & Manheim, 2011, p. 421-429; Rojecki, 2008). In these preview articles, FOX News journalists have demonstrated the same potential (FOX, 2011; Rojecki, 2008). Going further, if one considers the informational quality of the news based on policy issues and the depth to which these issues are explored, a reader would get a very fragmented picture, mostly from the ideological lens the media organizations tended to lean towards, as a result of these media organizations starting to chase increasingly fragmented audiences in an era of more channel choices (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 1-7; Pol 304 Lectures).

For example, because the FOX articles as a whole prioritized fiscal issues across both the preview and aftermath coverage, most of the coverage gravitated around proposals to cut Social Security and Medicare programs in order to address the budget deficit and national debt, of course tinged with authority disorder biases juxtaposing, for example, Paul Ryan against the rest of the GOP (and a core part of their base) by endorsing the above policy (Bennett, 2007, Ch.2; FOX & AP, 2011). Additional informational tidbits were also colored with partisan skepticism towards President Obama’s investments in clean energy development, expressing concern about the President’s possible collusion with Wisconsin-based solar company Orion Energy Systems on his “2012 campaign visit” to the state post-State of the Union and going on towards at the end mentioning clean energy companies that have gone out of business (Bennett, 2007, p. 251-254; FOX & AP, 2011). All in all, the FOX articles did not have very much informational depth compared to the New York Times, and more heavily relied on symbolic appeals to fears and uncertainties, very much fulfilling the informational biases that lean towards sensationalism (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 2 & 7; FOX, 2011).

Looking towards the informational quality provided by the New York Times articles examined in this paper, one can tell immediately the core audience is probably geared towards people strongly invested in political news in general (Pol 304 Lectures; Rojecki, 2008, p. 74-75). As Rojecki explains in his piece “Rhetorical Alchemy: American Exceptionalism and the War on Terror,” the New York Times is geared mainly towards the elite intellectuals (in the media and outside the media alike) with a core knowledge of political theory, such as in international relations and domestic affairs alike (Rojecki, 2008, p. 74-75). This tailoring towards a more informed and involved segment of the audience on the part of the New York Times is reflected in the greater detail provided in the articles (minus the gossip-oriented article talking about Congress’s “musical chairs”), which came close to establishing a reliable context or foreground for which the reader could evaluate the President’s statements in his State of the Union address (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; NY Times, 2011; Rojecki, 2008, p. 74-75).

For example, in the preview coverage of the President’s State of the Union address, there are informational tidbits intermixed within the articles (more often towards the middle or bottom away from the more “important” facts in the opening paragraphs) talking about what the traditions surrounding the State of the Union address are like (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 5 & 6; NY Times, 2011). In particular, what was highlighted is the role the State of the Union plays in both highlighting a President’s policy initiatives in a largely positive light (utilizing the much used sub-themes surrounding national unity and strength as examined above), whereby allowing the President to also simultaneously promote himself to the public in such times as reelection campaign years (Calmes, Zeleny, & NY Times, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). The last preview article (while not continuing the background informational tidbits on the State of the Union address itself) before the speech hinted at the larger context of economic issues principally revolving around the budget deficit and government spending, and the larger conflicting views about the role and scope of government between the two political parties that would be addressed primarily in the “after” coverage (Berger & NY Times, 2011).

Moreover, the “after coverage,” while still demonstrating the schizophrenic-like fragmentation of the media to a degree, continued to provide more information about the issues surrounding the budget deficit and federal government spending under a sub-heading of Republican party internal divides in the first article after the speech (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 2; Pol 304 Lectures; Zeleny & NY Times, 2011). This quasi-context was again interrupted by the second-to-last New York Times article in which journalists subtly complained about the staged nature of the State of the Union and journalism’s continued dependence before reverting back to previous exposition on Republican and Democratic clashes over the role of government and expanding the informational background by comparing and contrasting the President’s remarks with speeches made back in the 2008 elections when he was a candidate (Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 193-200; Peters & NY Times, 2011; Sanger & NY Times, 2011). Relatively little foreign policy context was given against which to juxtapose the President’s remarks, however, and it was almost as fragmented as in the FOX News articles, mostly expounding on rising economic competition from abroad that pose a challenge to American exceptionalism in the world (Rojecki, 2008; Sanger & NY Times, 2011).

All in all, anyone conducting research in the future and the audience alike would come out of reading these twelve articles with a very confused, fragmented understanding of what the President’s 2011 State of the Union address was about, due to the fact that despite journalistic standards and norms of objectivity that hung over all of the coverage I analyzed which actually opens up coverage to more informational biases (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 2 & 6). In other words, the coverage was exposed to biases early on, informed by the officials, the audience targeted by the media organization itself, and the ideological drift of the news organization (as a reflection of audience tastes) itself (Bennett, 2007; Graber, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). Now if we evaluate the informational value and accuracy of the articles as articulated above based on the standards of what constitutes “hard news,” an article would have to meet the requirements of containing “some public policy content or other useful public information” including provision of context to an event and analyzing of trends, causes, and possible solutions to issues presented (Bennett, 2007, p. 21). Meanwhile, soft news has a comparatively concise definition as more entertainment-oriented stories that are largely stripped of substantive content (Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 114-115). According to this definition, the following articles would roughly fall under the soft news category: “Lights, Camera, Action for the State of the Union” (FOX, “after” article), “As State of the Union Nears, Congress Plays Musical Chairs” (NY Times, preview article), and the FOX preview article “Supreme Court Justices Could Be No-Shows for Obama's State of the Union Address” that was more borderline in my assessment for their stretching of the bipartisanship narrative into the realm of celebrity superlatives and gossip (Bennett, 2007, Chs. 1 & 2; FOX, 2011; NY Times, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures).

While it was noticeably easier to recognize what pieces were considered largely useless in terms of substantive information, the definitions provided by Bennett and other scholars in attempting to define “hard” news are comparatively vague (Pol 304 Lectures). Thus, the only qualitative judgements I can make as to what of the articles I analyzed for this paper constitutes accurate and reliable “hard” news, I think the New York Times came closest largely by virtue of its target audience in the intellectual arena who was already relatively more invested in this type of political information (Bennett, 2007; Graber & Baum p. 113-125; Rojecki, 2008, p. 74-75). For example, I viewed the New York Times as portraying a slightly more accurate and representative picture of the address (although not perfect) compared to FOX because of its imperative towards it audience, despite both news organizations’ ideological drifts (Bennett, 2007; Graber & Baum p. 113-125; Rojecki, 2008, p. 74-75; Pol 304 Lectures). Now, audience tastes, economic pressures, reporting practices and norms, and the officials upon which most of the information in a news piece comes from essentially demonstrate the degree to which journalism can never be completely “objective” or bias free in the first place (Bennett, 2007; Pol 304 Lectures).

Essentially, journalism cannot match up with the mythical ideals as an independent, impartial institution integral to the informational needs of democracy as articulated by many in media academia, a central point emphasized by Thomas E. Patterson in his piece “The Miscast Institution” (Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 193). Patterson’s central argument, as relevant to this discussion, is that media is not built to be the ideal institution that serves simultaneously as both a watchdog and quasi-political organizational unit (replacing weaker political parties that used to be the primary political mechanism through which to influence the democratic process) whereby informing the audience of  candidate positions on issues, winnowing out of worthy candidates for office, and expecting to enable audience members to make informed decisions (Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 195-196). Patterson essentially argues that strong political parties have the built-in characteristics that allow them to be better arbiters in the electoral process in that they can see the “big picture” (long-term versus fragmented short-term reality), accountability to the public, and incentives to organize various publics vying for influence in the policy-making process into a stable, coherent party platform and coalition (Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 196).

As Patterson sees it, strong political parties, while not popularly perceived as functioning in the interests of the people, actually serve the informational needs of democracy much better than the media, which is ill-equipped in that it is predisposed to the fragmented short-term, and thus allows its issue agenda to be in constant flux rather than stable (Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 193-200; Pol 304 Lectures). Additionally, because the media “overestimates the voters’ knowledge of candidates and the speed with which they acquire it,” when most voters will not invest the adequate time and energy to understand the issues, voters in our democracy are exposed to a confusing informational system that does not provide the needed stability required for effective governance (Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 113-125; Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 193-200; Pol 304 Lectures). Nor, might I add, turning to audience expectation of the media, does all of the audience expect impartiality of the media in the political system, as demonstrated by Bennett and the Pew Center’s 2012 “Survey of Media Use in the United States” in which 34% of the audience is documented as seeing a “great deal of bias” and 30% “a fair amount of bias” in news coverage, with a slight skew provided by ideological affiliation (Bennett, 2007, p. 24-28; PEW, 2012, p. 4, 16).

All in all, when taking into account the immense amount of pressures by journalism to be both a watchdog and an institution that replaces a critical political institution (like the political party) while simultaneously dealing with all the pressures I have alluded to from other actors in the political journalistic system, it was no surprise to me that the twelve FOX and New York Times articles I analyzed do not live up to the lofty, ideal expectations as outlined by much of academia (Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 193-200; Pol 304 Lectures). Bennett’s suggestions in Chapter 8: All The News That Fits Democracy: Solutions for Citizens, Politicians, and Journalists, such as doing careful analyses of news coverage for informational biases, narratives, spin, and plot formulas, and seeking out additional information to construct one’s own narratives from the information gathered end up not taking into account the high time and energy costs from carrying out all of the above on a daily basis (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 8; Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 113-125; Pol 304 Lectures). As aforementioned, those more likely to invest that energy in being a well-informed citizen do so because they have a stake in certain topics like foreign affairs and presidential policy speeches (i.e. State of the Union addresses), compared the majority of citizens who are uninterested in such things (Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 193-200).

To conclude, in light of the twelve articles I analyzed in this paper from FOX and the New York Times and the reality check of the current situation in the political journalistic system, the best one can hope for is for mainstream news organizations to continue to adopt the approach of “soft news” and attach policy information and context to more entertainment-geared narratives to draw the attention of an inattentive public living their lives (Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 193-200). In other words, the best approach for media (because a complete overhaul of the system in which media is placed on the backburners in favor of strong political parties is unlikely) in light of audience expectations and the informational needs of democracy ideals, is one in which the media can try to find a middle ground between competing roles espoused by academia and the reality of their practice today as governed by the pressures I’ve detailed in this paper as manifested in the reporting of the two news outlets of President Obama’s 2011 State of the Union address (FOX, 2011; Graber & Baum, 2011, p. 113-125; Graber & Patterson, 2011, p. 193-200; NY Times, 2011; Pol 304 Lectures). How exactly a reform of the media is to be guided is beyond the scope of this paper, but I tried to speculate on what the media can do realistically to inform citizens in the interim in the confines of the current system (Bennett, 2007, Ch. 8; Pol 304 Lectures). It comes down to the media being able to adapt to the current system and continue to do their informational gathering as best as possible (which ultimately the articles I analyzed did to the best of their ability considering their multiple restraints), which is all one can realistically hope for in the future (Bennett, 2007; Pol 304 Lectures).

 
Works Cited:

Bennett, W. L. & Graber, D.A. (2007). News: The Politics of Illusion (6th ed.). New York: Pearson Longman.

Berger, J., & FOX News. (2011, January 21). Obama Gets Second Chance to Stress Jobs Focus at State of the Union. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/21/obama-gets-second-chance-stress-jobs-focus-state-union.html.

Berger, J., & New York Times. (2011, January 23). Senate Republicans to Oppose Obama’s Spending Plans. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/us/politics/24repubs.html.

Calmes, J., Zeleny, J., Stolberg, S. G., Cooper, H. & New York Times (2011, January 22). Obama to Press Centrist Agenda in His Address. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/us/politics/23obama.html?_r=0.

FOX News, & Associated Press. (2011, January 25). GOP Urge Obama to Join in Cutting Spending. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/25/gop-urge-obama-join-cutting-spending/.

FOX News, & Associated Press. (2011, January 22). Obama's Economic Agenda: Boost U.S. Competitiveness. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.foxnews.com/us/2011/01/22/obamas-economic-agenda-boost-competitiveness/.

FOX News.com. (2011, January 26). Obama Launches 2012 Campaign With Post-State of the Union Trip to Wisconsin. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/26/obama-launches-campaign-post-state-union-trip-wisconsin/.

Graber, D. (2011). Media Power in Politics (6th ed.). Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Pergram, C., & FOX News. (2011, January 26). Lights, Camera Action for the State of the Union. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://politics.blogs.foxnews.com/2011/01/26/lights-camera-action-state-union.

Peters, J. W., & New York Times. (2011, January 26). Full Presidential Speech Got an Unscripted Leak. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/27/us/politics/27speech.html.

PEW Research Center. (2012, February 7). Survey of Media Use in the United States. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/.

Rojecki, A. (2008). Rhetorical Alchemy: American Exceptionalism and the War on Terror. Political Communication, 25(1), 67-88. doi:10.1080/10584600701807935.

Ross, L., & FOX News (2011, January 24). Supreme Court Justices Could Be No-Shows for Obama's State of the Union Address. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/01/24/chief-justice-state-union-alito-begs/.

Rowland, K. and Washington Times (2011, January 13). Obama: May Good Come of Arizona Tragedy. Retrieved April 2, 2016, from https://uwlax.courses.wisconsin.edu/d2l/le/content/3163152/viewContent/19978729/View.

Sanger, D. E., & New York Times. (2011, January 25). Obama Sets Stage for Clash of Governing Ideals. Retrieved January 15, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/politics/26assess.html.

Steinhauer, J., Hulse, C. & New York Times (2011, January 22). As State of the Union Nears, Congress Plays Musical Chairs. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/us/politics/23seats.html.

White House Office of the Press Secretary. (2011, January 25). Remarks by the President in State of Union Address. Retrieved April 23, 2016, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.

Zeleny, J., & New York Times. (2011, January 25). Two G.O.P. Responses Point to Potential Fault Lines. Retrieved April 15, 2016, from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/politics/26repubs.html.

On the Media (Part 2): Information's Role in a Democracy

{The second of case studies concerning the media and democracy. The first was published on February 18, 2017.}

Enshrined in the First Amendment is a key instrument towards maintaining democracy: the free press (Bennett, 2007, p. 4). The free press ideally functions as a watchdog or as Cook (1998) terms a “fourth branch” of government, able to provide critical information on serious issues, as well as the policy activities of government to provide accountability on behalf of the citizens (Bennett, 2007, p. 4; Cook, p.2). Recently, forces have arisen within the sociopolitical and economic systems that challenge the media’s ability to remain an objective, independent force necessary for the functioning of democracy. Specifically, the consolidation of media companies into media conglomerates in which political news becomes part of a profiteering enterprise in concurrence with increasing informational biases in reporting threaten democratic problem-solving on serious issues (Bennett, 2007, p. 22, 40; Daws, 2009, p. 148). Thus, I will make the argument for the following question as central in guiding our study of political journalism in the context of these political and profit-influenced informational biases: What can be done to facilitate increased analytical depth and informational diversity in the news citizens consume in making important political decisions?

First, if we understand political journalism to be an institution or “fourth branch” that facilitates the continued free-flowing diversity of ideas necessary to a democratic society, this question becomes more relevant (Cook, 1998, p. 2-4). In turn, the question necessitates a closer examination of the mediated political journalistic system in order to evaluate its performance on this critical duty the press has (Bennett, 2007, p.4-5, 67). Stepping back to look at the political journalism system as a whole, the audience (i.e. citizens) indirectly receive news stories transmitted to them by journalists via multiple channels, via “assimilation in to existing cultural categories” or narrative patterns in order for these stories to connect with news consumers (Bennett, 2007, p. 40-41; Schudson, 2007, p. 253-254). These narrative forms reveal an inherent bias in the media that warrants closer examination for its impacts on the ability for citizens to critically evaluate information (Bennett, 2007, p. 41, 49, 61). If government derives its power from its citizens, citizens have a civic imperative to be well informed on issues from multiple perspectives in order to make the best decisions possible and be active participants in their government’s political processes (Bennett, 2007, p. 4-5). Furthermore, it becomes necessary to understand these informational biases and pre-determined news formulae as products of a shift to a profiteering news industry as quintessential to our understanding on how political journalism facilitates citizens’ comprehension of critical issues that affect our democratic system of government (Bennett, 2007, p. 22, 40, 49, 67; Cook, 1998, p.2-4; Schudson, p. 254-255). So far, our study of political journalism can be guided along more effectively via our evaluation of the media’s performance in relation to its critical democratic information dissemination function (Bennett, 2007, p. 2, 4).

Now, let us turn to an examination of how the central question of the media’s responsibility to disseminate in-depth coverage of issues important to our country’s democratic functioning from the lens of informational biases present in political news reporting. These four information biases hinted at above, known as personalization, dramatization, fragmentation, and authority-disorder bias provide an essential platform for our study of political journalism, as they show the evolution of media (in extension, political journalism) to more packaged, encapsulated, and isolated storytelling narratives that threaten the informational depth necessary for citizens’ understanding of their democracy (Bennett, 2007, p. 49; Schudson, 2007, p. 253). Moreover, the news media’s tendency to artificially induce or emphasize the dramatic, human-interests side of the story is not inherently problematic until we understand that political journalism is not using this device in order to connect people with in-depth analyses of the issues at hand (Bennett, 2007, p. 41). Moreover, because of these informational biases, people are presented with a barrage of events that seem unconnected instead of as part of the larger picture, making the world seem more chaotic and thus inviting citizens to forgo problem solving on serious issues because they seem inevitable (Bennett, 2007, p. 41, 61). However, the provision of in-depth analyses of the processes behind events would serve to de-mystify these seemingly unstoppable forces driving events (Bennett, 2007, p. 41, 61).

Continuing on our analysis of the importance of the central question of media information quality in relation to democratic functioning, because these informational biases influenced by the increased commercialization of journalism in general, the issue of democratic participation is critical. Recalling that the media is supposed to serve a critical function as the “fourth estate”, analogous to a fourth branch of government, as well as going further by incorporating an additional assumption supported by Cook (1998) that media serves as an “unelected intermediary institution,” the informational quality media provides becomes very much salient (Cook, 1998, p. 2, 4). Furthermore, to understand the media as an intermediary between the three branches of government and the people and study it from the standpoint that media is thus accountable in the quality of information it provides allows for a beneficially closer and structured study of the nuances and factors that come into play in regards to the interdependent elements of the political journalism model (Cook, 1998, p. 2-4). In other words, media as the informal “fourth branch” of our government provides an overarching model or context in which we can establish our study of political journalism via the various informational biases at play in everyday reporting that distort or leave out other events happening in the world (Bennett p. 59-61; Cook, 1998, p. 2-3).

Consequentially, we come back to the central question regarding how to facilitate increased informational quality and diversity in the media as essential to our understanding of media’s crucial role in democracy as an intermediary (Cook, 1998, p. 2-3). While there is considerable debate concerning media “reform,” including whether or not in trying to alleviate these informational quality issues brought about by various informational biases in the media would actually lead to governmental censorship of the news (and perhaps stifle the very news diversity that free market competition brings about), the central question I have presented provides a platform for exploration of these very critical issues affecting our democracy (“Narrative and the Human Condition” lecture, 2/1/16). Ultimately, if one can find an overarching model or central question from which to understand the media even as it is embedded in various societal institutions and forces in our democratic society, one’s study of political journalism takes on a scholarly significance or advances overall understanding of the media’s place and responsibility towards democratic functioning (Cook, 1998, p. 2-4).

In essence, media plays an enormous role in the functioning of our democracy today (Bennett, 2007, p. 4-5). Furthering our understanding of those news products (including their imperfections and the factors playing into how the media has incorporated these imperfections into everyday journalistic practices) in today’s mainstream media and how citizens’ understanding of the world can be better facilitated provides a clear and methodical way to understand the interrelationship between journalism and politics (Cook, 1998, p. 2-4). To conclude, the central question that I have posited in this analysis provides the scholarly framework needed to help stimulate further study of these informational biases in media in the context of its simultaneous function as the intermediary between citizens and the separate branches of government, despite the scholastically challenging prospect of media being connected to various forces at work in our country today (Cook, 1998, p. 2-4; Schudson, 2007, p. 254-255).


Works Cited:

Bennett, W. L. & Graber, D.A. (2007). News: The Politics of Illusion (6th ed.). New York: Pearson Longman.

Cook, T. E. (1998). Governing With the News: The News Media as a Political Institution (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Daws, L. B. (2009). Media Monopoly: Understanding Vertical and Horizontal Integration. Communication Teacher, 23(4), 148-152. Retrieved January 27, 2016, from http://libweb.uwlax.edu:2157/doi/pdf/10.1080/17404620903218783.

Schudson, M. (2007). The Anarchy of Events and the Anxiety of Story Telling. Political Communication, 24(3), 253-257. Retrieved January 27, 2016, from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10584600701471534.

On Democratic Engineering: Presidential Versus Parliamentary Systems

How does a country go about designing a democracy that can accommodate its people’s diverse interests in a peaceful manner but also be stable? The answer to this question has been debated mainly as a battle between parliamentary and presidential systems of government (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 449-452). Scholar Juan Linz started this debate in his cornerstone work that decried the long-term stability of a presidential system in the context of a new democracy, usually a heterogeneous society with deep divides (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 449-450). The main point of agreement between scholars has been the importance of constitutional and electoral system design in new democracies (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73; Lijphart, 2004, p. 96-97; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 469). Often in that context, democratic institutions (if existing) are weak and prone to collapse if they fail to peacefully channel disputes among various groups, potentially justifying to some the merits of authoritarianism (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 220-221; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450). Therefore, in the course of the following exploration of parliamentary and presidential systems, I would recommend that a new democracy establish a parliamentary system with proportional representation to ensure long-term viability.

Because the constitutional and institutional design choices are extensive, I will focus on one of the most crucial dynamics that determine a democracy’s long-term viability: executive-legislative relations (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 449-450). To start with, the main goal of a democracy is to provide for the needs of its citizens. Whether a country is coming out of violent conflict or had an authoritarian past, one of the first concerns is what system of government the constitution will enshrine: a presidential or parliamentary system. This choice will define the values the citizens wish to enshrine in their country and if the democracy will be either consensual or majoritarian in nature, thus profoundly impacting how policy is made (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 220). Choosing presidentialism entails that a country is choosing decisive policy-making and a swift government response over having a society that is truly representative (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 220). This tradeoff between representativeness and governability is the main dichotomy scholars have examined; this tradeoff has meant that presidentialism receives high praise in terms of being able to respond decisively in crisis events (Lijphart, 1991, p. 82). However, whether this decisiveness is an advantage in a new democracy is dubious, as it usually entails having a majoritarian system that endows the executive both with significant powers and a competing mandate (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450).

Essentially, what this means is that because both the legislature and executives are elected by the people, they both claim to be for the people. Therefore, these claims are not conducive to coalition-building and overall governmental stability (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450). While not as much of an issue in established democracies, in new democracies, this majoritarian executive-legislative dynamic can undermine any democratic institutions that have not had the chance to consolidate whereby potentially excluding minority interests from government (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450). In a new democracy with little institutions or entrenched institutions with authoritarian traits, a presidential system is very dangerous to put into place with the potential for an executive to accumulate through electoral mandate legislative or judicial powers (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 452). In general, presidential systems work out better in countries with relatively small and homogenous populations, which may not be the case in new democracies with territorial borders assigned during periods of colonization that have put diverse groups together arbitrarily in such a way as to increase the potential for destabilizing conflict (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 457).

Another reason to hesitate when instituting a presidential system is the fixed terms aspect, designed to promote accountability to voters and a check on executive power in a way that entails separation of powers in a system not as interdependent as the fused-powers system in parliamentarism (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). While some scholars have argued that fixed terms rigidity could be addressed through the calling of early elections in terms of policy continuity and stability, parliamentary systems retain an advantage in this area also with the “vote of no confidence” mechanism and the fused power nature of the system (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 453). Because the prime minister and legislature are mutually dependent on each other, in order to ensure majority support in parliament for policy coalition-building is a necessary prerequisite (Lijphart, 1991, p.73). This differs considerably from a presidential system that entails policymaking efficiency through the fact that the president with an electoral mandate can count on a single party cabinet and the limited coalition-building required of the executive in a majority party legislature (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73).

Thus, this vote mechanism provides an accountability safety valve for a parliamentary system in which there may be no fixed terms when coalitions fail to advance or cooperate on policy matters (Lijphart, 1991, p. 102). While this may prove more detrimental to a new democracy if the governing coalitions reach an impasse, the system can be amended to provide for immediate elections of a new prime minister and legislature, which is not usually possible in a presidential system even in a situation of executive-legislative deadlock due to fixed terms (Lijphart, 1991, p. 102). In other words, a vote of no confidence provides greater stability and policy continuity without the rigidity of fixed terms, while still retaining a mechanism that provides for voter accountability of the government when the coalition fails to deliver for its constituents (Lijphart, 1991, p. 102). In summation, parliamentarism has an advantage over presidentialism in ensuring governmental flexibility, relative political and policy stability and coalition-building as a necessity (Lijphart, 1991, p. 101-103). Tellingly, Mainwaring & Shugart (1997) note most “long-established democracies” are parliamentary (p. 169).

The choice of a presidential or parliamentary system not only impacts the democratic values that will be central to society (consensual versus majoritarian), but also the electoral laws that shape the party system (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 231). Like the choice of a presidential or parliamentary government, the choice of electoral system is often context specific, entailing greater advantages or disadvantages for the quality of democracy (Lijphart, 2004, p. 107). Party systems are vital, as they are the vehicles through which segments of society can effectively mobilize their policy positions (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 223). Therefore, an institutional engineer has two choices of electoral system: plurality or proportionality (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). In turn, these two systems tend to promote a two-party or multi-party system that tend to exhibit the broader characteristics of either a presidential or parliamentary system (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). Whereas a plurality system is one in which the candidate that wins the most votes in a single member district (SMD) wins a seat in the legislature, a proportional system (PR) of representation entails multi-member districts (MMD) and greater district representation in the legislature (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). New democracies tend to have established party systems (usually autocratic), although some democracies are created without institutionalized party systems, meaning parties can shift dramatically. Thus, non-institutionalization of parties can be potentially destabilizing (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 223). It is with this fact in mind that I recommend instituting a PR and MMD system to promote both the minority representation often lacking in a SMD plurality system and the ability to develop strong, multi-party rather than two party systems (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73-75).

Again, in a small country with a homogeneous population, a SMD plurality system would function optimally in its provision of a two-party system that favors more moderate larger parties (those able to garner a broader constituency than a minority party) and the relative efficiency of majoritarian decision-making resulting from a moderate coalition (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 457, 465). However, in a new democracy, minority representation could be prized more due to the greater emphasis on consensus in a formerly autocratic society (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73). Thus, a PR MMD system can be optimized to ensure that in districts with high numbers of representatives that the resulting multi-party legislature does not result in destabilizing deadlock and ideological polarization while allowing for policy formulation through the formation of governing coalitions (Lijphart, 1991, p. Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 465). This can be done through a threshold mechanism, in which a party is required to acquire a certain percentage of the vote to gain seats in the legislature and preventing extremist parties from harming the ability of moderate governing coalitions to form. This allows for a preservation of quality of democracy through representativeness while still retaining a measure that prevents harmful gridlock among the parties.

In conclusion, while both presidentialism and parliamentarism and their accompanying governmental systems have distinct advantages and disadvantages, the latter are largely dependent on context . Therefore, to engender a viable democracy with both greater quality of democracy through representativeness and the capacity to govern, a modified parliamentary system with a PR electoral system is optimal for new democracies (Lijphart, 2004, p. 83). In balancing these characteristics, countries can thus ensure for viable democracies in promoting consensus and minimizing the harmful adversarial tendencies of governing found in both presidential and parliamentary systems (Lijphart, 2004, p. 83). 

Works Cited:

Haerpfer, et al. (2009). Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. (1991). "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies." Journal of Democracy, 2(1), pp. 72-84.

Lijphart, Arend. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), pp. 96-109.

Mainwaring, S., & Shugart, M. (1997). Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics, 29(4), pp. 449-471.

Book Review: Joshua Green's "Devil's Bargain"

Steve Bannon. While not much in the news lately since his falling out of the Trump administration in late August, there is no doubt that he was highly influential in the unlikely success of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign (and perhaps in similar campaigns in Europe). This is the central argument in Joshua Green's 2017 book Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, which seeks to highlight what Green terms the underestimated "missing piece of the puzzle" in the complex set of factors and circumstances most often cited in order to explain Donald Trump's victory in November 2016, such as "James Comey, the Russians, the media, 'fake news,' sexism" and so on (Green, 2017, p. 20). In other words, Green claims that one can't tell the (complete) story of Trump without examining the story of Bannon.

Utilizing a common literary device, Green opens with a chapter showing the victory of the Trump campaign, before entering into a flashback for the rest of the book to explain this implausible outcome, chronicling Bannon's biographical background and his rise to Trump's campaign. Green does a great job of making sense of a very convoluted story, showing how Bannon made his mainstream political debut after drifting through a Catholic high school, Virginia Tech, the Navy, Harvard, Goldman Sachs, Hollywood (in his bankrolling and aiding in the production of right-wing films, such as the Islam-focused In the Face of Evil in 2004), and ending up in the right-wing media organization Breitbart News. In all of these instances, Green helps trace the ideological evolution of Bannon throughout his long and varied career, with each experience confirming a weakness of the United States (such as the Iran-Contra scandal and failed hostage rescue) that could only be rectified through an embrace of a no-nonsense, far-right populism/nationalism. Green writes that "everywhere Bannon looked in the modern world, he saw signs of collapse and an encroaching globalist order stamping out the last vestiges of the traditional" (Green, 2017, p. 206).

By the time he reached Donald Trump's campaign, he was convinced of the need to help this far-right populist ideology gain mainstream appeal in order to save America (and Western civilization) from the combined menaces of Islamic terrorism, immigration, feminism, socialism, political correctness, and (of course) the Clinton machine that was in cahoots with the hated globalist-oriented establishment. The vessel that would ultimately carry Bannon's Breitbart ideology away from the fringes was Donald Trump, with this ideology a crude cudgel to wield against the hated establishment. However, this was not the end of Bannon's strategy to mainstream far-right ideology. Bannon made further back-room partnerships with right-wing donors like the Mercer family to set up a multitude of organizations that would help to legitimize his preferred ideology, such as Breitbart News, the Government Accountability Institute (GAI), Christian film company Glittering Steel, and data analytics company Cambridge Analytica.

Therefore, Bannon brought his shrewd right-wing intellectualism and his connections with the above organizations to Trump's campaign, allowing for the commencement of Bannon's strategy to take down Hillary Clinton in the election. This next phase of Bannon's plan to legitimize an establishment-destroying "revolution" was to set a series of fact-based traps for Hillary Clinton, most of which were seeded within liberal-leaning mainstream news organizations such as The New York Times as these organizations picked up on narratives concerning the Clinton machine, corruption, and the Clinton emails from Breitbart News and Wikileaks (which themselves drew deep from the non-indexed "Deep Web" portion of the Internet, dubbed by the GAI as "the Matrix") and other right-wing media sources (Green, 2017, p. 155). The ultimate result of this strategy was not to gain Trump support necessarily (Bannon and Trump were counting on Trump's base of mostly old, white, rural and blue-collar workers to win election day), but to sow doubt within Hillary Clinton's base of reliably liberal urban, suburban, women and minority voters (i.e. to persuade these voters to stay home on election day).

But wait, there's more! This strategy of sowing doubt aligned with the Trump campaign's other media strategy of distracting from various scandals (such as the infamous Access Hollywood tape) by pointing to what Bannon and Trump saw as equivalent (but unfairly unacknowledged) scandals on the Clinton side (such as Bill Clinton's sexual misconduct in the 1990s). In the end, anger, doubt, and distraction won Trump the day.

Overall, while the book comes out a bit dated as it concludes by predicting Bannon's eventual dismissal as the Trump administration tries to govern in a more mainstream way that is antithetical to Bannon's notion of blowing up government (Bannon was fired in August), it nevertheless succeeds by helping to elucidate the ideological and organizational foundations of Trump's campaign, thereby providing insight into the Trump governing philosophy. In addition, it provides yet another warning that the nationalist/populist tide on the rise in both America and in the European democracies has largely succeeded as a result of shrewd media and political messaging strategies that help to bring previously fringe ideologies into the political mainstream. Only time will tell if Trump and other similarly-founded administrations in Europe can succeed in governing with such extreme right-wing ideologies.


Works Cited:

Green, Joshua. (2017). Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency. New York: Penguin Press.

Book Review: "Women in Game of Thrones"

On first glance, the show Game of Thrones and the book series it is based off of, George R.R. Martin's A Song of Ice and Fire don't appear to be shining feminist icons in either a metaphorical or literal sense. However, like any great story, there are many layers present between the characters, the plot, the themes and the symbols present. Naturally, the question of whether or not the Game of Thrones show or book series A Song of Ice and Fire can be considered remotely feminist has been hotly debated. Valerie Estelle Frankel jumps into this debate with a candid (and intriguing) pop-culture analysis of both the books and the show in her 2014 book Women in Game of Thrones: Power, Conformity and Resistance.

Frankel's analysis is on multiple levels:

1. Comparing the presentation of the female characters in the books to their counterparts on the show
2. Comparing both the book characters and their show counterparts with closely related historical figures from the medieval European historical context of the royal conflict the War of Roses that Game of Thrones draws upon
3. Critically examining both the book and the show (through season three) from a modern feminist lens 
4. The examination of these female characters as fitting (or transcending) common literary tropes and archetypes using a blend of psychological, feminist, and literary theories

Thus, her critical examination of the female characters of a Game of Thrones is an ambitious one, considering that the book (subtracting the character appendices and index) is 184 pages. However, Frankel does a good job with providing a good overview for her readers to counter the book length limitation, first by introducing the both major and minor characters in Game of Thrones: Daenerys, Arya, Cersei, Brienne, Osha, Asha, Catelyn, Sansa, Margaery, Shae, Ros, Lady Olenna, Old Nan (and many more). What helps readers to keep track of these characters as Frankel progresses through her four levels of anlaysis is the common thread of the fact that these female characters all manage to find ways to subvert or challenge the patriarchal and misogynist culture present in fictional Westeros in both obvious (i.e. military conquest or fighting as Daenerys, Arya, and Brienne notably engage in) to more subtle ways (such as Lady Olenna and Sansa Stark). However, there is a catch: while engaged in expressions of feminine power in a society that very much distrusts female autonomy and agency, it is these portrayals in both the books and the show that can be problematic. In other words, while the women characters all advance somewhat (despite their varying places on a spectrum of engaging in subtle to overt challenges to patriarchal structures and ideas), what is most important is how they advance.

For example, the most cited examples by Frankel of problematic assertions of female power and advancement in Game of Thrones can be seen in the Stockholm-like love story of Daenerys Targaryen with the Dothraki warlord Khal Drogo (their relationship in the show begins with a rape, and both in the books and show, Daenerys is sold in marriage like property to Drogo by her power-hungry brother Viserys in exchange for an army that could reconquer Westeros for him) and the sorceress Melisandre of Asshai, who seduces men and practices a perverse form of dark birthing magic to kill in the service of her liege lord (and claimant to the Iron Throne) Stannis Baratheon. In addition, while doing anything to protect her child (including engaging in occasional physical fights and other escapades), minor character Gilly seems mostly to be a one-note character, that is the devoted mother submissive to male characters in exchange for her (and her child's) protection. Lastly, in the vein of postcolonial feminist theory, Frankel gives voice to critiques that Daenerys's story as a conqueror started off primarily from the troubling vantage point of being a white messiah figure to the darker skinned slaves she frees (who call her their mother) in the east before going west back to Westeros.

The big take-away from Franke's archetype/trope and historical and feminist analyses for me is that the diverse cast of Game of Thrones female characters (and their feminist potential) are the most limited when these characters are shoved into one strict role (i.e. warrior versus mother verus widow versus helpless maiden) and many of the "strong" female characters (Arya, Brienne, Daenerys) seem to reject their femininity and take on the "normal" masculine standard (use of physical force, contempt for "stupid" and submissive girls and women). Also, I wouldn't be doing a true Game of Thrones analysis without mentioning the fact that these women characters are severely limited and their character growth stunted when they seem primarily to be involved in the books and the show as sexual objects, with no self-worth or their own identities as people in exception to their relations with men. (As someone who's read the books and watched the show, sex is used too much as a plot device to service men than as something that the women characters consent to or enjoy as they live their lives. Yet, it seems to have gotten better as the books and show progresses.)

So, is Game of Thrones feminist? Frankel's conclusion (one which I agree with) is that it is in some ways and is more problematic than others. We'll have to wait and see for the final season of the show and the last two books of the A Song of Ice and Fire series to provide a more updated conclusion.


Works Cited:

Frankel, Valerie Estelle. (2014). Women in Game of Thrones: Power, Conformity and Resistance. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland Publishers.

Book Review: Amy Chua's "Day of Empire"

Immigration. Tolerance. These concepts are political buzzwords right now, especially after the contentious and bitter presidential election of the previous year. However, these concepts are nothing new and have constantly been a source of debate practically since the beginning of human civilization. These problems, characteristic of a multicultural and multiethnic society, are particularly acute in what Amy Chua terms as "hyperpowers" (rare globally dominant empires) in her 2009 book Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall  (p. xxi). Meant as a critical examination of the evolution of these hyperpowers over time (from military and conquest-focused to the modern commercial focused) and their similarities in their rises and falls, Day of Empire also serves as a very timely lesson concerning America's present and potential future (either as a multicultural society or not).

Chua begins her critical examination by taking a bird's eye view snapshot of important past empires that were arguably world dominant (insofar as what the known borders of the world were to a particular power at the time), starting with Achaemenid Persia (Achaemenid refers to the dominant tribe at the time in what is now roughly modern day Iran). From Persia, Chua takes the reader briefly through history by chronicling the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, China's Tang Dynasty, the Mongol Empire, medieval Spain, the Dutch Empire (more commercial rather than territorial in nature), the Ottoman Empire, China's Ming Dynasty, the Mughal Empire, the British Empire, Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and modern-day America. Additionally, modern day China, the European Union (EU), and India are given brief attention along with America in terms of each power's potential and the obstacles to achieving superpower or even hyperpower status in relation to America's current hyperpower status. Out of all these societies, what were deemed hyperpowers by Chua and which societies did not make the grade?

Chua names Achaemenid Persia, the Roman Empire, the Tang Dynasty, the Mongol Empire, the Dutch Empire, the British Empire and contemporaneous America as hyperpowers (having made a dominant influence on the world at some point in their societal development). The Spanish, Ottoman, Ming, Mughal, Nazi, and Japanese empires peaked at superpower status at best (regional power at the very least). Why? Chua argues that while there are myriad and variable factors depending on the historical case concerned, a huge factor that ties all the cases together is the degree of tolerance a society showed towards the peoples their societies ruled over or heavily influenced. In other words, diversity presented a double-edged sword for societies that emerged as the unipolar powers of their times, both giving societies the necessary population and economic, political (to some degree), cultural and social dynamism needed to vault to the top in the latter dimensions and also an underlying tension that threatened overall societal collusion. While getting the best and brightest of multiple societies (including their economic and technological know-how) vaulted these societies to the top of their power, it also became more difficult to provide the "glue" (a common identity or idea that links people to the state or empire and makes them more likely to give their allegiance to said centralized power) that the empire needed to retain its cohesion over time (Chua, 2009, p. xxix, 330).

Eventually, while all of the empires listed above (aside from present day America) declined for multiple reasons (all of the latter factors normally gradual reasons for societies at the top to necessarily decline including territorial, militaristic, or economic overreach, high debts, increasingly authoritarian political policies, the institution of official state religions or languages, etc.), undergirding it all (and often accelerating the decline) was often a corresponding rise in destabilizing xenophobia, intolerance, and violence. Therefore, past societies often balanced on a knife's edge in trying to both open their societies to as many diverse peoples as possible in order to further strategic ends (i.e. achieving as much power in as many areas as possible) while mitigating the destabilizing potential of their multicultural/multiethnic societies. The societies that were the most open staved off this decline for much longer than those societies that were never able to extend their "strategic tolerance" to as many of the peoples as possible that composed their society, with prominent examples being Spanish and the Nazis (Chua, 2009, p. 249-250).

So where does America fit into all of this? Chua implies that the United States could be on the decline from its hyperpower status it achieved post WWII, the culmination of centuries of being an immigrant nation and the only country relatively intact after the war. The oft-cited threats to American unipolar power (China, India, the EU, and potentially Russia and their rises relative to America) combined with a latent global resentment from failed interventions in the Middle East primarily designed to impose an American model of democracy and peace on the countries concerned (along with its overall dominant power in the international system) and a domestic trend towards gradual isolationism (of course including elements of xenophobia and racism prominently seen in the 2016 election rhetoric concerning immigration and national security) are formidable obstacles for America today.

Yet, these obstacles are ones that have been seen before. The good news for readers is, according to Chua, America can retain its dynamism and power by resisting the inwards turn that often accelerates a society's decline (whether or not it is an empire in the traditional or the modern sense, where societies become influential primarily through non-military means). Resisting isolationism includes critical but practical immigration policies that allow America to continue drawing the world's talent and use it for strategic benefit (as well as the other tangible benefits of a diverse society) as well as cementing America's informal influence over the international system by the reinforcing of existing multilateral institutions and the making of new multilateral, bilateral, and regional institutions. Therefore, I agree with Chua's assertion that the latter will help provide the necessary glue that binds America to the world and consequently help to retain both America's power and good image internationally. However, first we as a country have to come to a consensus and rediscover the values that initially bound (and continue to bind) America together. Yes, that includes immigration and tolerance. Can America do this? In her conclusion, Chua makes a convincing and hopeful case to the reader in the end of the book that yes, America can learn the lessons of the past and overcome these obstacles in the long-run.

All in all, I would recommend this book for all readers because of Chua's ability to present a clear big picture (despite being too concise and general in some parts of her historical analysis in order to build support for her thesis) and, while arguing for a positive outcome for America in the long-run, leaves it up to the reader to make up their own minds about the critical issues considered in Day of Empire.


Works Cited:

Chua, Amy. (2009). Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall. New York: Anchor Books.

Book Review: Yuval Noah Harari's "Homo Deus"

While no one can see the future, many people (whether scholars or not) have tried to predict it by examining today's trends and extrapolating them into the future. Therefore, Yuval Noah Harari is continuing this scholarly tradition in his latest book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (a sequel to Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind), while still managing to stand out. Why does this book stand out among the rest? Harari's book takes a multidisciplinary yet very accessible look at today's world in order to make his case about the three major developments he sees humanity most likely following in the 21st century: striving towards immortality, ultimate happiness, and the creation of enhanced (and potentially artificial) life (which starts with humans merging with machines while creating artificial intelligence).

However, to better understand Harari's bold predictions about the future, we have to understand the context. To do this, Harari reviews key concepts from his previous book Sapiens to give a brief overview of how humanity has claimed dominance on planet Earth. As Harari notes, "in the last few decades we have managed to rein in famine, plague and war" (Harari, 2017, p. 1). Undergirding this astounding rise of civilization are key ideas, concepts, and narratives that Harari pointed out helped to cement cooperation between larger and larger groups of people, including humanism, scientific inquiry, and religion. What all of these latter ideas have in common is that they are convenient narratives that have given humanity the excuse and justification for their dominion over Earth and their centrality to the universe. Firstly, humanism puts the focus on an individual (a human individual) and their unique experiences and feelings. Humanism brings us the popular (and familiar) ideas of liberty, free will, and a license to pursue one's happiness however they wish (as long as it doesn't hurt others). Secondly, the development of science as we know it today with the Scientific Revolution enabled humans to explore an expanding world and universe (from first the planet to sending probes and telescopes into space), expand humanity's knowledge of said universe, and develop new technologies and ways of living. Thirdly, the emergence of mono or poly-theistic religions like Christianity and Hinduism (to name a few) supplanted hunter-gatherer systems of belief like animism that attributed all life as having equal value and importance in the story of the universe.

Where does humanity go from here? Towards immortality, happiness, and the achievement of god-like status. Harari expands on these predictions in the last two sections of the book, and gives a disclaimer that the book is not necessarily a prophecy (more like an educated, provocative guess) and that the achievement of his future depends on humanity still cooperating on an international level and not fractured by all-consuming war, disease, and ecological catastrophe. Yet, the consequences that Harari outlines as probably resulting from astronomic advances in biotechnology, computer science, and artificial intelligence seem exactly like the conditions that would undermine the progress of human civilization. The potential emergence of a class of super-humans (those enhanced by biotechnology or merged with machines and also those who develop increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligences/algorithms, also known as Homo Deus) and an accompanying class of "economically useless" humans (read: un-enhanced humans or those not at the top of the technocratic ladder) would seem to deepen the present day issues of income inequality, discrimination, and the dangerous accumulation of power towards those at the social, political, and economic elite (Harari, 2017, p. 309).

That's not it though. The new developments (and accompanying techno-religions Harari sees as becoming in-vogue with the new superhuman elite based on the unity of science with Big Data) also raise troubling questions about the future of democratic government, human rights, and many other international programs. Harari admits that these new superhuman elites (or perhaps eventually, inorganic life-forms) emerge because of the great expense of these new biotechnologies and advances in artificial intelligence, meaning that the rich are most likely to have access to near-immortality and divinity (and are not going to have incentives to share the benefits with the masses, even taking into account the delay in new technologies eventually trickling down from the elites to the masses). Is this a future that humanity wishes to have (if this does come to pass)? Can the cooperation between large groups of people achieved so far largely underneath the banner of democracy, capitalism and liberalism that have managed to vault humanity to preeminence be sustained in the face of present-day obstacles and forces that Harari's envisioned future would magnify tenfold? Can civilization sustain itself without mass cooperation?

Harari partially addresses these latter concerns by countering that humanity is likely to subsume itself in virtual reality (at least, within the larger virtual community already in place, bonded together by computers, telecommunications, and the Internet), especially those new economically expendable people (i.e. the masses). I feel that this is the most plausible out of all of Harari's predictions (aside from continuing divides between the elite and the masses), as people increasingly plug-in to the Internet via mobile phones, tablets, and computers (and grant giant technology corporations like Google and Apple unprecedented access to personal data). That seems to be the current trend with technology today, that humanity comes to have more value (or see itself as having more value) as a collective rather than as a collection of individuals.

Overall, Homo Deus presents a unique dystopian vision of humanity's future in the 21st century, one that utilizes a multidisciplinary approach to challenge readers' preconceptions and make them uncomfortable. However, despite my simultaneous discomfort and enjoyment of the book (and my misgivings at some of the predictions presented within it), Harari nevertheless provided me with a new point of view on the megatrends of the present and their potential future consequences. Also, what made this book both provocative and yet so successful is that the book simultaneously answered many questions and raised many, many more (allowing readers to engage in critical thinking and to come to their own conclusions). I would recommend that everyone read this book, from the merely curious everyday person to policymakers involved in making social, political, and economic decisions at the top levels, as it asks critical questions about the kind of future we want to have as a society.


Works Cited: 

Harari, Yuval Noah. (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins.