In 2010, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in a highly controversial case raising the question of if corporations and their union counterparts had First Amendment rights equal to that of individuals under the Constitution. This case, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, had the potential to overturn Progressive era limitations on corporations' and unions' political contributions to candidates of their choice. When the 5-4 ruling in favor of Citizens United came down the news pipeline, it shocked the American political system. Why? Virtually unlimited spending was now allowed by wealthy groups on each side of the political spectrum as long as political contributions were given to groups not directly affiliated with candidates (i.e. political action committees or PACs). How did this come to be? Jane Mayer uncovers the story behind the Citizens United case and its embedded context within a hugely polarized political system in her 2016 book Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right.
{I'll begin with a disclaimer on my summary and analysis of Mayer's book by saying that while both Republicans and Democrats have hugely wealthy donors at their disposal ready to influence election outcomes, the Republicans have used their wealth more to their advantage.}
The story of Citizens United goes back at least a half century. Mayer traces the historical development of a sophisticated network of organizations and institutions largely financed by ultraconservative and ultra-rich donors like the infamous Koch brothers that injected previously fringe libertarian ideas concerning the need for government whose only function would be to provide for the protection of property rights into mainstream discourse at the scholarly and everyday levels. This complex network was largely a mix of charitable foundations and 501(c)4 and 501(c)6 organizations (social welfare groups and business leagues, respectively) that allowed donors both anonymity and tax deductions in their contributions (often from foundations) to these ostensibly nonpartisan groups that pervaded national discussions with previously fringe ideologies.
The peddling of a comprehensive strategy of ultimately stripping government of its power to tax and regulate business (i.e. environmental protection measures like the Clean Air Act to minimize industrial sources of pollution) was disguised as a freedom crusade, given credibility by cloaking these self-serving ideals in a mantle of patriotism. While money is definitely a huge force in politics these days since the watershed Citizens United case, Mayer shows that ideology is more formidable in its ability to affect citizens' thinking (read: voting) on critical issues like business regulation in the long-term. The synergy behind money and ideas thus serves as an amplifier for ideology, allowing it to reach larger audiences, critical in any campaign to change public thinking and thus put into place representatives more likely to contribute toward favorable short and long-term legislative outcomes. For industrial giants like Koch Industries, this includes legislation that limits government's ability to mitigate the effects of everything from dangerous speculative practices in the financial sector to fighting industrial greenhouse gas emissions contributing to climate change.
Outside of the scary implications Citizens United has for the democratic process in the United States, Mayer's book is doubly scary in her showing that the rich could (and at least with the Republicans, did) supplant traditional political party structures with their own monetary and other political infrastructure (and making it look like their ideology and preferred legislative outcomes are backed by the public). The fact that these ultra-rich (or 1%) could create their own de facto political parties to drown out the voices of traditional parties (which largely are supposed to represent the interests of the little guy) should give people, no matter their party or ideological affiliation, pause.
While it would be interesting to see a similar investigation into like networks on the left as well as the right, Mayer's book is illuminating and thought provoking overall, forcing readers to ask tough questions about the current state of our democracy. Can it still be called a democracy? Or has the U.S. begun to slide towards a plutocracy (i.e. government by the rich and for the rich)? Mayer leaves these questions up to the reader to decide, but ultimately makes a convincing argument for the fact that all is not lost if citizens fight back and can rekindle a flagging sense of civic duty and participation in governmental affairs.
Works Cited:
Mayer, Jane. (2016). Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the Radical Right. New York: Penguin Random House LLC.
Tuesday, August 29, 2017
Thursday, August 24, 2017
Book Review: Graham Allison's "Destined for War"
While many books covering China these days are focused on the future of the international system, Graham Allison's Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? goes a step further in a lucid and down-to-earth examination of the issue in its utilization of the conceptual framework of Thucydides's Trap. This concept highlights the increasingly conflictual dynamics between a rising power (the Greek city-state of Athens being the earliest example) and an established (but possibly declining) power (with Sparta being the earliest example). Allison concisely explains these high-stress Thucydidean dynamics in which even "ordinary flashpoints of foreign affairs...can trigger large-scale conflict" between the two powers during a time when the balance of power seems to be in flux and the established power fears what the ascendance of the rising power means for their interests (p. 29).
After an introduction of one of the cornerstone concepts in international relations, Allison provides a detailed study of the first case of Thucydides's Trap in the devastating war between Athens and Sparta. It is not until later chapters that Allison addresses the more contemporary case of a potential Thucydides's Trap in the maneuverings of China (a rising power) and the United States (an established power). Raising the stakes in a potential conflict between China and the United States are the size of the populations involved in both countries (and in countries around the world who are allies or foes to these powers), the size of their respective economies, the speed of China's economic rise, the scale of worldwide trade (especially the traffic in shipping lanes in the disputed South China Sea) and the fact that militarized conflicts these days involve cyber-warfare and nuclear weapons (as an incredibly destructive last resort).
Allison illustrates these higher stakes in a series of (frighteningly realistic) potential small spats that manage to escalate to hot war when the cost for both sides engaging in diplomacy or otherwise backing out increases concurrently with the need to de-escalate even as the time to de-escalate decreases as each side makes its move. Some of the more worryingly realistic examples Allison highlights relates to a collapse of the regime of Chinese ally North Korea, a Taiwanese move for independence from the mainland, and a trade spat (i.e. the labeling of China as currency-manipulators, economic sanctions, cyber-warfare, etc.) in the light of a bombastic Trump administration. While not naming the hypothetical presidential administration that an escalating trade war between China and the U.S., Allison probably is alluding to Trump's campaign rhetoric of promising to label China a currency manipulator and demanding a reduction in the trade deficit in his larger fight against the international economic establishment.
While these hypothetical scenarios of how China and the U.S. might enter into a potentially world-ending conflict seem frighteningly mundane at the outset, Allison reassures readers that there are ways to avoid the Thucydides's Trap that makes war more likely between two countries. Among some of the more salient proscriptions are accommodation and a renegotiation of the relationship between the two powers. While accommodation is a bitter, nasty word in today's politics (implying total submission to another's desires), this option proves much more realistic because it entails not submission to each other's national interests in totality, but the reaching of a compromise that preserves both powers' interests. Details within such a potential compromise include recognizing the other's respective spheres of influence (i.e. the Western hemisphere versus the contentious South China Sea region) and even arms reductions talks similar to those negotiated between the former Soviet Union and the U.S. Further cementing this relationship, in Allison's eyes, should be the four "mega-threats" of "nuclear Armageddon, nuclear anarchy, global terrorism...and climate change" (p. 228) that are the most likely to prove the most severe threat to each country's very existence (let alone interests).
While 4 out 16 cases of the Thucydides Trap in the last 500 years not ending in a war don't seem like terribly good odds (especially because of domestic pressures adding fuel to the fire), Allison's core message of the book is that war is not unavoidable. If both sides can negotiate pacts that give advantages to both parties while reducing the size of the other's nuclear arsenals (potential domestic political costs for both leaders be damned) and recognizing the greater threats to humanity out there, I believe that we have a chance. However, it does not look good when the publics and leaders of both sides are ratcheting up their rhetoric.
Works Cited:
Allison, Graham T. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (1st ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: New York.
After an introduction of one of the cornerstone concepts in international relations, Allison provides a detailed study of the first case of Thucydides's Trap in the devastating war between Athens and Sparta. It is not until later chapters that Allison addresses the more contemporary case of a potential Thucydides's Trap in the maneuverings of China (a rising power) and the United States (an established power). Raising the stakes in a potential conflict between China and the United States are the size of the populations involved in both countries (and in countries around the world who are allies or foes to these powers), the size of their respective economies, the speed of China's economic rise, the scale of worldwide trade (especially the traffic in shipping lanes in the disputed South China Sea) and the fact that militarized conflicts these days involve cyber-warfare and nuclear weapons (as an incredibly destructive last resort).
Allison illustrates these higher stakes in a series of (frighteningly realistic) potential small spats that manage to escalate to hot war when the cost for both sides engaging in diplomacy or otherwise backing out increases concurrently with the need to de-escalate even as the time to de-escalate decreases as each side makes its move. Some of the more worryingly realistic examples Allison highlights relates to a collapse of the regime of Chinese ally North Korea, a Taiwanese move for independence from the mainland, and a trade spat (i.e. the labeling of China as currency-manipulators, economic sanctions, cyber-warfare, etc.) in the light of a bombastic Trump administration. While not naming the hypothetical presidential administration that an escalating trade war between China and the U.S., Allison probably is alluding to Trump's campaign rhetoric of promising to label China a currency manipulator and demanding a reduction in the trade deficit in his larger fight against the international economic establishment.
While these hypothetical scenarios of how China and the U.S. might enter into a potentially world-ending conflict seem frighteningly mundane at the outset, Allison reassures readers that there are ways to avoid the Thucydides's Trap that makes war more likely between two countries. Among some of the more salient proscriptions are accommodation and a renegotiation of the relationship between the two powers. While accommodation is a bitter, nasty word in today's politics (implying total submission to another's desires), this option proves much more realistic because it entails not submission to each other's national interests in totality, but the reaching of a compromise that preserves both powers' interests. Details within such a potential compromise include recognizing the other's respective spheres of influence (i.e. the Western hemisphere versus the contentious South China Sea region) and even arms reductions talks similar to those negotiated between the former Soviet Union and the U.S. Further cementing this relationship, in Allison's eyes, should be the four "mega-threats" of "nuclear Armageddon, nuclear anarchy, global terrorism...and climate change" (p. 228) that are the most likely to prove the most severe threat to each country's very existence (let alone interests).
While 4 out 16 cases of the Thucydides Trap in the last 500 years not ending in a war don't seem like terribly good odds (especially because of domestic pressures adding fuel to the fire), Allison's core message of the book is that war is not unavoidable. If both sides can negotiate pacts that give advantages to both parties while reducing the size of the other's nuclear arsenals (potential domestic political costs for both leaders be damned) and recognizing the greater threats to humanity out there, I believe that we have a chance. However, it does not look good when the publics and leaders of both sides are ratcheting up their rhetoric.
Works Cited:
Allison, Graham T. (2017). Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (1st ed.). Houghton Mifflin Harcourt: New York.
Thursday, August 17, 2017
Book Review: David Priess's "The President's Book of Secrets"
Ever been curious about how presidents get their daily dose of intelligence and how that might then influence their decisions in the international arena? David Priess, in his book The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents takes a look at the evolution of what today is known as the President's Daily Briefings (PDB) in the backdrop of various presidential administrations, from Lyndon Johnson to Barack Obama.
While not revealing the details of classified intelligence in his analysis, Priess traces the development of a distilled collection of classified intelligence from various agencies (the CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), etc.) to the administration of Lyndon Johnson in 1964. This organization and distillation of intelligence targeted exclusively to the president and other close advisers came in order to try and overcome a complicated workflow between intelligence agencies and a backlog of lengthy intelligence reports that were not getting through to the policymakers that needed them. Back in 1964 (during the Cold War) the first attempt at conveying critical information to the president was known as the Daily Summary, a step taken in order to meet increasing demand for information concerning the Soviet Union's military and economic capabilities.
However, this Daily Summary was not very comprehensive and largely focused on the Soviet Union. Sporadic attention was given to other countries in the Eurasian region, let alone other countries outside of that region. Gradually, as the United States began to realize its position as a world power, with increasing social, political and economic clout, so too did the demand for more and diverse content come into play from administration to administration. This included a need for more regional and country-based intelligence as well as (in some cases) analysis included with the presented facts to provide a much needed context within what evolved into the PDB. Concurrent with more analysis, certain issues began to take increasing prominence within the PDB, especially intelligence relating to terrorism. Examples of the need for this can be seen in the increased attention the Middle East and Asia have been given in American foreign policy, as well as the 9/11 attacks. After 9/11, domestic sources of intelligence (mostly from the FBI) began to be included within the PDB's mix of extensive foreign sources to help bolster counter-terrorism efforts against groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Moreover, as technology improved, the hardcover/bound PDB has been presented in more digital forms. For example, President Obama received his PDBs on a specially secured iPad. Priess goes on to speculate that the PDB will evolve fully from paper to digital forms once technological advances such as quantum computing are realized, with future presidents receiving their PDBs as futuristic holograms providing 3D graphics. But, as always, technology has its limits when it comes to the PDB. How a president chooses to receive their daily information about relevant domestic and foreign affairs will always be the predominant factor shaping the scope and method of PDB presentation, from more hands-on formats to more in-depth reports with less graphical aids.
While Priess was not allowed to reveal the specifics of the classified intelligence that shaped each administration's Lyndon Johnson to President Obama or provide a robust critique concerning intelligence gathering practices for the PDB, his book nevertheless provides an intriguing narrative about each president's (and their administration's) personalities and interactions with the PDB (and larger intelligence community). It makes one wonder about the current president's interaction with the PDB and its relationship with the resulting domestic and foreign policy decisions considering the noted animosity and indifference the Trump administration has shown the intelligence community. If this uneasiness persists between presidents and the intelligence community, it would portend a concerning dynamic of administrations making critical policy and other decisions without adequate information. And that's just at the domestic level, excluding the intelligence relationships the U.S. has with its allies.
Sources Cited:
Priess, D. (2017). The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents from Kennedy to Obama. (1st ed.). New York: PublicAffairs.
While not revealing the details of classified intelligence in his analysis, Priess traces the development of a distilled collection of classified intelligence from various agencies (the CIA, FBI, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Director of National Intelligence (DNI), etc.) to the administration of Lyndon Johnson in 1964. This organization and distillation of intelligence targeted exclusively to the president and other close advisers came in order to try and overcome a complicated workflow between intelligence agencies and a backlog of lengthy intelligence reports that were not getting through to the policymakers that needed them. Back in 1964 (during the Cold War) the first attempt at conveying critical information to the president was known as the Daily Summary, a step taken in order to meet increasing demand for information concerning the Soviet Union's military and economic capabilities.
However, this Daily Summary was not very comprehensive and largely focused on the Soviet Union. Sporadic attention was given to other countries in the Eurasian region, let alone other countries outside of that region. Gradually, as the United States began to realize its position as a world power, with increasing social, political and economic clout, so too did the demand for more and diverse content come into play from administration to administration. This included a need for more regional and country-based intelligence as well as (in some cases) analysis included with the presented facts to provide a much needed context within what evolved into the PDB. Concurrent with more analysis, certain issues began to take increasing prominence within the PDB, especially intelligence relating to terrorism. Examples of the need for this can be seen in the increased attention the Middle East and Asia have been given in American foreign policy, as well as the 9/11 attacks. After 9/11, domestic sources of intelligence (mostly from the FBI) began to be included within the PDB's mix of extensive foreign sources to help bolster counter-terrorism efforts against groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Moreover, as technology improved, the hardcover/bound PDB has been presented in more digital forms. For example, President Obama received his PDBs on a specially secured iPad. Priess goes on to speculate that the PDB will evolve fully from paper to digital forms once technological advances such as quantum computing are realized, with future presidents receiving their PDBs as futuristic holograms providing 3D graphics. But, as always, technology has its limits when it comes to the PDB. How a president chooses to receive their daily information about relevant domestic and foreign affairs will always be the predominant factor shaping the scope and method of PDB presentation, from more hands-on formats to more in-depth reports with less graphical aids.
While Priess was not allowed to reveal the specifics of the classified intelligence that shaped each administration's Lyndon Johnson to President Obama or provide a robust critique concerning intelligence gathering practices for the PDB, his book nevertheless provides an intriguing narrative about each president's (and their administration's) personalities and interactions with the PDB (and larger intelligence community). It makes one wonder about the current president's interaction with the PDB and its relationship with the resulting domestic and foreign policy decisions considering the noted animosity and indifference the Trump administration has shown the intelligence community. If this uneasiness persists between presidents and the intelligence community, it would portend a concerning dynamic of administrations making critical policy and other decisions without adequate information. And that's just at the domestic level, excluding the intelligence relationships the U.S. has with its allies.
Sources Cited:
Priess, D. (2017). The President's Book of Secrets: The Untold Story of Intelligence Briefings to America's Presidents from Kennedy to Obama. (1st ed.). New York: PublicAffairs.
Sunday, August 13, 2017
On First Ladies and Their International Roles
Often, when one thinks of the First Lady of the United States (FLOTUS), the images that most commonly come to mind are those of her as hostess when a foreign leader or representative comes to the White House. Or hosting their counterparts in luncheons while their husbands may be in meetings discussing at length foreign affairs. If abroad, often we see her on the arm of her husband on trips abroad (as we have seen recently with Melania Trump). To some degree then, FLOTUS has become a very visible international figure. However, domestic rather than international affairs are often associated with FLOTUS, for various reasons I briefly introduce below.
Arguably, while modern first ladies have achieved considerable agency in their informal position as partner of the president, all first ladies have struggled within the constraints of gender stereotyping, traditional gender roles, and (to some extent) the Constitution itself (which is silent on the official role a presidential spouse may play). This produces a dynamic in which the First Lady can be notably restrained when trying to have formal policy influence while still seen as a feminist icon. Extrapolated to the domain of international affairs, this complicated dynamic becomes more readily visible. For example, how does one define international influence? Is it formal or informal, through advocation of policy or taking on social causes?
In the video below, I briefly explore the history of FLOTUS as an international figure and then go on to focus on three first ladies with varying degrees of influence on international affairs or foreign policy: Eleanor Roosevelt, Hillary Clinton, and Michelle Obama.
Arguably, while modern first ladies have achieved considerable agency in their informal position as partner of the president, all first ladies have struggled within the constraints of gender stereotyping, traditional gender roles, and (to some extent) the Constitution itself (which is silent on the official role a presidential spouse may play). This produces a dynamic in which the First Lady can be notably restrained when trying to have formal policy influence while still seen as a feminist icon. Extrapolated to the domain of international affairs, this complicated dynamic becomes more readily visible. For example, how does one define international influence? Is it formal or informal, through advocation of policy or taking on social causes?
In the video below, I briefly explore the history of FLOTUS as an international figure and then go on to focus on three first ladies with varying degrees of influence on international affairs or foreign policy: Eleanor Roosevelt, Hillary Clinton, and Michelle Obama.
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