Steve Bannon. While not much in the news lately since his falling out of the Trump administration in late August, there is no doubt that he was highly influential in the unlikely success of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign (and perhaps in similar campaigns in Europe). This is the central argument in Joshua Green's 2017 book Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency, which seeks to highlight what Green terms the underestimated "missing piece of the puzzle" in the complex set of factors and circumstances most often cited in order to explain Donald Trump's victory in November 2016, such as "James Comey, the Russians, the media, 'fake news,' sexism" and so on (Green, 2017, p. 20). In other words, Green claims that one can't tell the (complete) story of Trump without examining the story of Bannon.
Utilizing a common literary device, Green opens with a chapter showing the victory of the Trump campaign, before entering into a flashback for the rest of the book to explain this implausible outcome, chronicling Bannon's biographical background and his rise to Trump's campaign. Green does a great job of making sense of a very convoluted story, showing how Bannon made his mainstream political debut after drifting through a Catholic high school, Virginia Tech, the Navy, Harvard, Goldman Sachs, Hollywood (in his bankrolling and aiding in the production of right-wing films, such as the Islam-focused In the Face of Evil in 2004), and ending up in the right-wing media organization Breitbart News. In all of these instances, Green helps trace the ideological evolution of Bannon throughout his long and varied career, with each experience confirming a weakness of the United States (such as the Iran-Contra scandal and failed hostage rescue) that could only be rectified through an embrace of a no-nonsense, far-right populism/nationalism. Green writes that "everywhere Bannon looked in the modern world, he saw signs of collapse and an encroaching globalist order stamping out the last vestiges of the traditional" (Green, 2017, p. 206).
By the time he reached Donald Trump's campaign, he was convinced of the need to help this far-right populist ideology gain mainstream appeal in order to save America (and Western civilization) from the combined menaces of Islamic terrorism, immigration, feminism, socialism, political correctness, and (of course) the Clinton machine that was in cahoots with the hated globalist-oriented establishment. The vessel that would ultimately carry Bannon's Breitbart ideology away from the fringes was Donald Trump, with this ideology a crude cudgel to wield against the hated establishment. However, this was not the end of Bannon's strategy to mainstream far-right ideology. Bannon made further back-room partnerships with right-wing donors like the Mercer family to set up a multitude of organizations that would help to legitimize his preferred ideology, such as Breitbart News, the Government Accountability Institute (GAI), Christian film company Glittering Steel, and data analytics company Cambridge Analytica.
Therefore, Bannon brought his shrewd right-wing intellectualism and his connections with the above organizations to Trump's campaign, allowing for the commencement of Bannon's strategy to take down Hillary Clinton in the election. This next phase of Bannon's plan to legitimize an establishment-destroying "revolution" was to set a series of fact-based traps for Hillary Clinton, most of which were seeded within liberal-leaning mainstream news organizations such as The New York Times as these organizations picked up on narratives concerning the Clinton machine, corruption, and the Clinton emails from Breitbart News and Wikileaks (which themselves drew deep from the non-indexed "Deep Web" portion of the Internet, dubbed by the GAI as "the Matrix") and other right-wing media sources (Green, 2017, p. 155). The ultimate result of this strategy was not to gain Trump support necessarily (Bannon and Trump were counting on Trump's base of mostly old, white, rural and blue-collar workers to win election day), but to sow doubt within Hillary Clinton's base of reliably liberal urban, suburban, women and minority voters (i.e. to persuade these voters to stay home on election day).
But wait, there's more! This strategy of sowing doubt aligned with the Trump campaign's other media strategy of distracting from various scandals (such as the infamous Access Hollywood tape) by pointing to what Bannon and Trump saw as equivalent (but unfairly unacknowledged) scandals on the Clinton side (such as Bill Clinton's sexual misconduct in the 1990s). In the end, anger, doubt, and distraction won Trump the day.
Overall, while the book comes out a bit dated as it concludes by predicting Bannon's eventual dismissal as the Trump administration tries to govern in a more mainstream way that is antithetical to Bannon's notion of blowing up government (Bannon was fired in August), it nevertheless succeeds by helping to elucidate the ideological and organizational foundations of Trump's campaign, thereby providing insight into the Trump governing philosophy. In addition, it provides yet another warning that the nationalist/populist tide on the rise in both America and in the European democracies has largely succeeded as a result of shrewd media and political messaging strategies that help to bring previously fringe ideologies into the political mainstream. Only time will tell if Trump and other similarly-founded administrations in Europe can succeed in governing with such extreme right-wing ideologies.
Works Cited:
Green, Joshua. (2017). Devil's Bargain: Steve Bannon, Donald Trump, and the Storming of the Presidency. New York: Penguin Press.
Friday, November 24, 2017
Friday, November 17, 2017
Book Review: "Women in Game of Thrones"
On first glance, the show Game of Thrones and the book series it is based off of, George R.R. Martin's A Song of Ice and Fire don't appear to be shining feminist icons in either a metaphorical or literal sense. However, like any great story, there are many layers present between the characters, the plot, the themes and the symbols present. Naturally, the question of whether or not the Game of Thrones show or book series A Song of Ice and Fire can be considered remotely feminist has been hotly debated. Valerie Estelle Frankel jumps into this debate with a candid (and intriguing) pop-culture analysis of both the books and the show in her 2014 book Women in Game of Thrones: Power, Conformity and Resistance.
Frankel's analysis is on multiple levels:
For example, the most cited examples by Frankel of problematic assertions of female power and advancement in Game of Thrones can be seen in the Stockholm-like love story of Daenerys Targaryen with the Dothraki warlord Khal Drogo (their relationship in the show begins with a rape, and both in the books and show, Daenerys is sold in marriage like property to Drogo by her power-hungry brother Viserys in exchange for an army that could reconquer Westeros for him) and the sorceress Melisandre of Asshai, who seduces men and practices a perverse form of dark birthing magic to kill in the service of her liege lord (and claimant to the Iron Throne) Stannis Baratheon. In addition, while doing anything to protect her child (including engaging in occasional physical fights and other escapades), minor character Gilly seems mostly to be a one-note character, that is the devoted mother submissive to male characters in exchange for her (and her child's) protection. Lastly, in the vein of postcolonial feminist theory, Frankel gives voice to critiques that Daenerys's story as a conqueror started off primarily from the troubling vantage point of being a white messiah figure to the darker skinned slaves she frees (who call her their mother) in the east before going west back to Westeros.
The big take-away from Franke's archetype/trope and historical and feminist analyses for me is that the diverse cast of Game of Thrones female characters (and their feminist potential) are the most limited when these characters are shoved into one strict role (i.e. warrior versus mother verus widow versus helpless maiden) and many of the "strong" female characters (Arya, Brienne, Daenerys) seem to reject their femininity and take on the "normal" masculine standard (use of physical force, contempt for "stupid" and submissive girls and women). Also, I wouldn't be doing a true Game of Thrones analysis without mentioning the fact that these women characters are severely limited and their character growth stunted when they seem primarily to be involved in the books and the show as sexual objects, with no self-worth or their own identities as people in exception to their relations with men. (As someone who's read the books and watched the show, sex is used too much as a plot device to service men than as something that the women characters consent to or enjoy as they live their lives. Yet, it seems to have gotten better as the books and show progresses.)
So, is Game of Thrones feminist? Frankel's conclusion (one which I agree with) is that it is in some ways and is more problematic than others. We'll have to wait and see for the final season of the show and the last two books of the A Song of Ice and Fire series to provide a more updated conclusion.
Works Cited:
Frankel, Valerie Estelle. (2014). Women in Game of Thrones: Power, Conformity and Resistance. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland Publishers.
Frankel's analysis is on multiple levels:
- Comparing the presentation of the female characters in the books to their counterparts on the show
- Comparing both the book characters and their show counterparts with closely related historical figures from the medieval European historical context of the royal conflict the War of Roses that Game of Thrones draws upon
- Critically examining both the book and the show (through season three) from a modern feminist lens
- The examination of these female characters as fitting (or transcending) common literary tropes and archetypes using a blend of psychological, feminist, and literary theories
For example, the most cited examples by Frankel of problematic assertions of female power and advancement in Game of Thrones can be seen in the Stockholm-like love story of Daenerys Targaryen with the Dothraki warlord Khal Drogo (their relationship in the show begins with a rape, and both in the books and show, Daenerys is sold in marriage like property to Drogo by her power-hungry brother Viserys in exchange for an army that could reconquer Westeros for him) and the sorceress Melisandre of Asshai, who seduces men and practices a perverse form of dark birthing magic to kill in the service of her liege lord (and claimant to the Iron Throne) Stannis Baratheon. In addition, while doing anything to protect her child (including engaging in occasional physical fights and other escapades), minor character Gilly seems mostly to be a one-note character, that is the devoted mother submissive to male characters in exchange for her (and her child's) protection. Lastly, in the vein of postcolonial feminist theory, Frankel gives voice to critiques that Daenerys's story as a conqueror started off primarily from the troubling vantage point of being a white messiah figure to the darker skinned slaves she frees (who call her their mother) in the east before going west back to Westeros.
The big take-away from Franke's archetype/trope and historical and feminist analyses for me is that the diverse cast of Game of Thrones female characters (and their feminist potential) are the most limited when these characters are shoved into one strict role (i.e. warrior versus mother verus widow versus helpless maiden) and many of the "strong" female characters (Arya, Brienne, Daenerys) seem to reject their femininity and take on the "normal" masculine standard (use of physical force, contempt for "stupid" and submissive girls and women). Also, I wouldn't be doing a true Game of Thrones analysis without mentioning the fact that these women characters are severely limited and their character growth stunted when they seem primarily to be involved in the books and the show as sexual objects, with no self-worth or their own identities as people in exception to their relations with men. (As someone who's read the books and watched the show, sex is used too much as a plot device to service men than as something that the women characters consent to or enjoy as they live their lives. Yet, it seems to have gotten better as the books and show progresses.)
So, is Game of Thrones feminist? Frankel's conclusion (one which I agree with) is that it is in some ways and is more problematic than others. We'll have to wait and see for the final season of the show and the last two books of the A Song of Ice and Fire series to provide a more updated conclusion.
Works Cited:
Frankel, Valerie Estelle. (2014). Women in Game of Thrones: Power, Conformity and Resistance. Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland Publishers.
Friday, November 10, 2017
Book Review: Amy Chua's "Day of Empire"
Immigration. Tolerance. These concepts are political buzzwords right now, especially after the contentious and bitter presidential election of the previous year. However, these concepts are nothing new and have constantly been a source of debate practically since the beginning of human civilization. These problems, characteristic of a multicultural and multiethnic society, are particularly acute in what Amy Chua terms as "hyperpowers" (rare globally dominant empires) in her 2009 book Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall (p. xxi). Meant as a critical examination of the evolution of these hyperpowers over time (from military and conquest-focused to the modern commercial focused) and their similarities in their rises and falls, Day of Empire also serves as a very timely lesson concerning America's present and potential future (either as a multicultural society or not).
Chua begins her critical examination by taking a bird's eye view snapshot of important past empires that were arguably world dominant (insofar as what the known borders of the world were to a particular power at the time), starting with Achaemenid Persia (Achaemenid refers to the dominant tribe at the time in what is now roughly modern day Iran). From Persia, Chua takes the reader briefly through history by chronicling the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, China's Tang Dynasty, the Mongol Empire, medieval Spain, the Dutch Empire (more commercial rather than territorial in nature), the Ottoman Empire, China's Ming Dynasty, the Mughal Empire, the British Empire, Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and modern-day America. Additionally, modern day China, the European Union (EU), and India are given brief attention along with America in terms of each power's potential and the obstacles to achieving superpower or even hyperpower status in relation to America's current hyperpower status. Out of all these societies, what were deemed hyperpowers by Chua and which societies did not make the grade?
Chua names Achaemenid Persia, the Roman Empire, the Tang Dynasty, the Mongol Empire, the Dutch Empire, the British Empire and contemporaneous America as hyperpowers (having made a dominant influence on the world at some point in their societal development). The Spanish, Ottoman, Ming, Mughal, Nazi, and Japanese empires peaked at superpower status at best (regional power at the very least). Why? Chua argues that while there are myriad and variable factors depending on the historical case concerned, a huge factor that ties all the cases together is the degree of tolerance a society showed towards the peoples their societies ruled over or heavily influenced. In other words, diversity presented a double-edged sword for societies that emerged as the unipolar powers of their times, both giving societies the necessary population and economic, political (to some degree), cultural and social dynamism needed to vault to the top in the latter dimensions and also an underlying tension that threatened overall societal collusion. While getting the best and brightest of multiple societies (including their economic and technological know-how) vaulted these societies to the top of their power, it also became more difficult to provide the "glue" (a common identity or idea that links people to the state or empire and makes them more likely to give their allegiance to said centralized power) that the empire needed to retain its cohesion over time (Chua, 2009, p. xxix, 330).
Eventually, while all of the empires listed above (aside from present day America) declined for multiple reasons (all of the latter factors normally gradual reasons for societies at the top to necessarily decline including territorial, militaristic, or economic overreach, high debts, increasingly authoritarian political policies, the institution of official state religions or languages, etc.), undergirding it all (and often accelerating the decline) was often a corresponding rise in destabilizing xenophobia, intolerance, and violence. Therefore, past societies often balanced on a knife's edge in trying to both open their societies to as many diverse peoples as possible in order to further strategic ends (i.e. achieving as much power in as many areas as possible) while mitigating the destabilizing potential of their multicultural/multiethnic societies. The societies that were the most open staved off this decline for much longer than those societies that were never able to extend their "strategic tolerance" to as many of the peoples as possible that composed their society, with prominent examples being Spanish and the Nazis (Chua, 2009, p. 249-250).
So where does America fit into all of this? Chua implies that the United States could be on the decline from its hyperpower status it achieved post WWII, the culmination of centuries of being an immigrant nation and the only country relatively intact after the war. The oft-cited threats to American unipolar power (China, India, the EU, and potentially Russia and their rises relative to America) combined with a latent global resentment from failed interventions in the Middle East primarily designed to impose an American model of democracy and peace on the countries concerned (along with its overall dominant power in the international system) and a domestic trend towards gradual isolationism (of course including elements of xenophobia and racism prominently seen in the 2016 election rhetoric concerning immigration and national security) are formidable obstacles for America today.
Yet, these obstacles are ones that have been seen before. The good news for readers is, according to Chua, America can retain its dynamism and power by resisting the inwards turn that often accelerates a society's decline (whether or not it is an empire in the traditional or the modern sense, where societies become influential primarily through non-military means). Resisting isolationism includes critical but practical immigration policies that allow America to continue drawing the world's talent and use it for strategic benefit (as well as the other tangible benefits of a diverse society) as well as cementing America's informal influence over the international system by the reinforcing of existing multilateral institutions and the making of new multilateral, bilateral, and regional institutions. Therefore, I agree with Chua's assertion that the latter will help provide the necessary glue that binds America to the world and consequently help to retain both America's power and good image internationally. However, first we as a country have to come to a consensus and rediscover the values that initially bound (and continue to bind) America together. Yes, that includes immigration and tolerance. Can America do this? In her conclusion, Chua makes a convincing and hopeful case to the reader in the end of the book that yes, America can learn the lessons of the past and overcome these obstacles in the long-run.
All in all, I would recommend this book for all readers because of Chua's ability to present a clear big picture (despite being too concise and general in some parts of her historical analysis in order to build support for her thesis) and, while arguing for a positive outcome for America in the long-run, leaves it up to the reader to make up their own minds about the critical issues considered in Day of Empire.
Works Cited:
Chua, Amy. (2009). Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall. New York: Anchor Books.
Chua begins her critical examination by taking a bird's eye view snapshot of important past empires that were arguably world dominant (insofar as what the known borders of the world were to a particular power at the time), starting with Achaemenid Persia (Achaemenid refers to the dominant tribe at the time in what is now roughly modern day Iran). From Persia, Chua takes the reader briefly through history by chronicling the rise and fall of the Roman Empire, China's Tang Dynasty, the Mongol Empire, medieval Spain, the Dutch Empire (more commercial rather than territorial in nature), the Ottoman Empire, China's Ming Dynasty, the Mughal Empire, the British Empire, Nazi Germany, imperial Japan, and modern-day America. Additionally, modern day China, the European Union (EU), and India are given brief attention along with America in terms of each power's potential and the obstacles to achieving superpower or even hyperpower status in relation to America's current hyperpower status. Out of all these societies, what were deemed hyperpowers by Chua and which societies did not make the grade?
Chua names Achaemenid Persia, the Roman Empire, the Tang Dynasty, the Mongol Empire, the Dutch Empire, the British Empire and contemporaneous America as hyperpowers (having made a dominant influence on the world at some point in their societal development). The Spanish, Ottoman, Ming, Mughal, Nazi, and Japanese empires peaked at superpower status at best (regional power at the very least). Why? Chua argues that while there are myriad and variable factors depending on the historical case concerned, a huge factor that ties all the cases together is the degree of tolerance a society showed towards the peoples their societies ruled over or heavily influenced. In other words, diversity presented a double-edged sword for societies that emerged as the unipolar powers of their times, both giving societies the necessary population and economic, political (to some degree), cultural and social dynamism needed to vault to the top in the latter dimensions and also an underlying tension that threatened overall societal collusion. While getting the best and brightest of multiple societies (including their economic and technological know-how) vaulted these societies to the top of their power, it also became more difficult to provide the "glue" (a common identity or idea that links people to the state or empire and makes them more likely to give their allegiance to said centralized power) that the empire needed to retain its cohesion over time (Chua, 2009, p. xxix, 330).
Eventually, while all of the empires listed above (aside from present day America) declined for multiple reasons (all of the latter factors normally gradual reasons for societies at the top to necessarily decline including territorial, militaristic, or economic overreach, high debts, increasingly authoritarian political policies, the institution of official state religions or languages, etc.), undergirding it all (and often accelerating the decline) was often a corresponding rise in destabilizing xenophobia, intolerance, and violence. Therefore, past societies often balanced on a knife's edge in trying to both open their societies to as many diverse peoples as possible in order to further strategic ends (i.e. achieving as much power in as many areas as possible) while mitigating the destabilizing potential of their multicultural/multiethnic societies. The societies that were the most open staved off this decline for much longer than those societies that were never able to extend their "strategic tolerance" to as many of the peoples as possible that composed their society, with prominent examples being Spanish and the Nazis (Chua, 2009, p. 249-250).
So where does America fit into all of this? Chua implies that the United States could be on the decline from its hyperpower status it achieved post WWII, the culmination of centuries of being an immigrant nation and the only country relatively intact after the war. The oft-cited threats to American unipolar power (China, India, the EU, and potentially Russia and their rises relative to America) combined with a latent global resentment from failed interventions in the Middle East primarily designed to impose an American model of democracy and peace on the countries concerned (along with its overall dominant power in the international system) and a domestic trend towards gradual isolationism (of course including elements of xenophobia and racism prominently seen in the 2016 election rhetoric concerning immigration and national security) are formidable obstacles for America today.
Yet, these obstacles are ones that have been seen before. The good news for readers is, according to Chua, America can retain its dynamism and power by resisting the inwards turn that often accelerates a society's decline (whether or not it is an empire in the traditional or the modern sense, where societies become influential primarily through non-military means). Resisting isolationism includes critical but practical immigration policies that allow America to continue drawing the world's talent and use it for strategic benefit (as well as the other tangible benefits of a diverse society) as well as cementing America's informal influence over the international system by the reinforcing of existing multilateral institutions and the making of new multilateral, bilateral, and regional institutions. Therefore, I agree with Chua's assertion that the latter will help provide the necessary glue that binds America to the world and consequently help to retain both America's power and good image internationally. However, first we as a country have to come to a consensus and rediscover the values that initially bound (and continue to bind) America together. Yes, that includes immigration and tolerance. Can America do this? In her conclusion, Chua makes a convincing and hopeful case to the reader in the end of the book that yes, America can learn the lessons of the past and overcome these obstacles in the long-run.
All in all, I would recommend this book for all readers because of Chua's ability to present a clear big picture (despite being too concise and general in some parts of her historical analysis in order to build support for her thesis) and, while arguing for a positive outcome for America in the long-run, leaves it up to the reader to make up their own minds about the critical issues considered in Day of Empire.
Works Cited:
Chua, Amy. (2009). Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall. New York: Anchor Books.
Thursday, November 2, 2017
Book Review: Yuval Noah Harari's "Homo Deus"
While no one can see the future, many people (whether scholars or not) have tried to predict it by examining today's trends and extrapolating them into the future. Therefore, Yuval Noah Harari is continuing this scholarly tradition in his latest book Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow (a sequel to Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind), while still managing to stand out. Why does this book stand out among the rest? Harari's book takes a multidisciplinary yet very accessible look at today's world in order to make his case about the three major developments he sees humanity most likely following in the 21st century: striving towards immortality, ultimate happiness, and the creation of enhanced (and potentially artificial) life (which starts with humans merging with machines while creating artificial intelligence).
However, to better understand Harari's bold predictions about the future, we have to understand the context. To do this, Harari reviews key concepts from his previous book Sapiens to give a brief overview of how humanity has claimed dominance on planet Earth. As Harari notes, "in the last few decades we have managed to rein in famine, plague and war" (Harari, 2017, p. 1). Undergirding this astounding rise of civilization are key ideas, concepts, and narratives that Harari pointed out helped to cement cooperation between larger and larger groups of people, including humanism, scientific inquiry, and religion. What all of these latter ideas have in common is that they are convenient narratives that have given humanity the excuse and justification for their dominion over Earth and their centrality to the universe. Firstly, humanism puts the focus on an individual (a human individual) and their unique experiences and feelings. Humanism brings us the popular (and familiar) ideas of liberty, free will, and a license to pursue one's happiness however they wish (as long as it doesn't hurt others). Secondly, the development of science as we know it today with the Scientific Revolution enabled humans to explore an expanding world and universe (from first the planet to sending probes and telescopes into space), expand humanity's knowledge of said universe, and develop new technologies and ways of living. Thirdly, the emergence of mono or poly-theistic religions like Christianity and Hinduism (to name a few) supplanted hunter-gatherer systems of belief like animism that attributed all life as having equal value and importance in the story of the universe.
Where does humanity go from here? Towards immortality, happiness, and the achievement of god-like status. Harari expands on these predictions in the last two sections of the book, and gives a disclaimer that the book is not necessarily a prophecy (more like an educated, provocative guess) and that the achievement of his future depends on humanity still cooperating on an international level and not fractured by all-consuming war, disease, and ecological catastrophe. Yet, the consequences that Harari outlines as probably resulting from astronomic advances in biotechnology, computer science, and artificial intelligence seem exactly like the conditions that would undermine the progress of human civilization. The potential emergence of a class of super-humans (those enhanced by biotechnology or merged with machines and also those who develop increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligences/algorithms, also known as Homo Deus) and an accompanying class of "economically useless" humans (read: un-enhanced humans or those not at the top of the technocratic ladder) would seem to deepen the present day issues of income inequality, discrimination, and the dangerous accumulation of power towards those at the social, political, and economic elite (Harari, 2017, p. 309).
That's not it though. The new developments (and accompanying techno-religions Harari sees as becoming in-vogue with the new superhuman elite based on the unity of science with Big Data) also raise troubling questions about the future of democratic government, human rights, and many other international programs. Harari admits that these new superhuman elites (or perhaps eventually, inorganic life-forms) emerge because of the great expense of these new biotechnologies and advances in artificial intelligence, meaning that the rich are most likely to have access to near-immortality and divinity (and are not going to have incentives to share the benefits with the masses, even taking into account the delay in new technologies eventually trickling down from the elites to the masses). Is this a future that humanity wishes to have (if this does come to pass)? Can the cooperation between large groups of people achieved so far largely underneath the banner of democracy, capitalism and liberalism that have managed to vault humanity to preeminence be sustained in the face of present-day obstacles and forces that Harari's envisioned future would magnify tenfold? Can civilization sustain itself without mass cooperation?
Harari partially addresses these latter concerns by countering that humanity is likely to subsume itself in virtual reality (at least, within the larger virtual community already in place, bonded together by computers, telecommunications, and the Internet), especially those new economically expendable people (i.e. the masses). I feel that this is the most plausible out of all of Harari's predictions (aside from continuing divides between the elite and the masses), as people increasingly plug-in to the Internet via mobile phones, tablets, and computers (and grant giant technology corporations like Google and Apple unprecedented access to personal data). That seems to be the current trend with technology today, that humanity comes to have more value (or see itself as having more value) as a collective rather than as a collection of individuals.
Overall, Homo Deus presents a unique dystopian vision of humanity's future in the 21st century, one that utilizes a multidisciplinary approach to challenge readers' preconceptions and make them uncomfortable. However, despite my simultaneous discomfort and enjoyment of the book (and my misgivings at some of the predictions presented within it), Harari nevertheless provided me with a new point of view on the megatrends of the present and their potential future consequences. Also, what made this book both provocative and yet so successful is that the book simultaneously answered many questions and raised many, many more (allowing readers to engage in critical thinking and to come to their own conclusions). I would recommend that everyone read this book, from the merely curious everyday person to policymakers involved in making social, political, and economic decisions at the top levels, as it asks critical questions about the kind of future we want to have as a society.
Works Cited:
Harari, Yuval Noah. (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins.
However, to better understand Harari's bold predictions about the future, we have to understand the context. To do this, Harari reviews key concepts from his previous book Sapiens to give a brief overview of how humanity has claimed dominance on planet Earth. As Harari notes, "in the last few decades we have managed to rein in famine, plague and war" (Harari, 2017, p. 1). Undergirding this astounding rise of civilization are key ideas, concepts, and narratives that Harari pointed out helped to cement cooperation between larger and larger groups of people, including humanism, scientific inquiry, and religion. What all of these latter ideas have in common is that they are convenient narratives that have given humanity the excuse and justification for their dominion over Earth and their centrality to the universe. Firstly, humanism puts the focus on an individual (a human individual) and their unique experiences and feelings. Humanism brings us the popular (and familiar) ideas of liberty, free will, and a license to pursue one's happiness however they wish (as long as it doesn't hurt others). Secondly, the development of science as we know it today with the Scientific Revolution enabled humans to explore an expanding world and universe (from first the planet to sending probes and telescopes into space), expand humanity's knowledge of said universe, and develop new technologies and ways of living. Thirdly, the emergence of mono or poly-theistic religions like Christianity and Hinduism (to name a few) supplanted hunter-gatherer systems of belief like animism that attributed all life as having equal value and importance in the story of the universe.
Where does humanity go from here? Towards immortality, happiness, and the achievement of god-like status. Harari expands on these predictions in the last two sections of the book, and gives a disclaimer that the book is not necessarily a prophecy (more like an educated, provocative guess) and that the achievement of his future depends on humanity still cooperating on an international level and not fractured by all-consuming war, disease, and ecological catastrophe. Yet, the consequences that Harari outlines as probably resulting from astronomic advances in biotechnology, computer science, and artificial intelligence seem exactly like the conditions that would undermine the progress of human civilization. The potential emergence of a class of super-humans (those enhanced by biotechnology or merged with machines and also those who develop increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligences/algorithms, also known as Homo Deus) and an accompanying class of "economically useless" humans (read: un-enhanced humans or those not at the top of the technocratic ladder) would seem to deepen the present day issues of income inequality, discrimination, and the dangerous accumulation of power towards those at the social, political, and economic elite (Harari, 2017, p. 309).
That's not it though. The new developments (and accompanying techno-religions Harari sees as becoming in-vogue with the new superhuman elite based on the unity of science with Big Data) also raise troubling questions about the future of democratic government, human rights, and many other international programs. Harari admits that these new superhuman elites (or perhaps eventually, inorganic life-forms) emerge because of the great expense of these new biotechnologies and advances in artificial intelligence, meaning that the rich are most likely to have access to near-immortality and divinity (and are not going to have incentives to share the benefits with the masses, even taking into account the delay in new technologies eventually trickling down from the elites to the masses). Is this a future that humanity wishes to have (if this does come to pass)? Can the cooperation between large groups of people achieved so far largely underneath the banner of democracy, capitalism and liberalism that have managed to vault humanity to preeminence be sustained in the face of present-day obstacles and forces that Harari's envisioned future would magnify tenfold? Can civilization sustain itself without mass cooperation?
Harari partially addresses these latter concerns by countering that humanity is likely to subsume itself in virtual reality (at least, within the larger virtual community already in place, bonded together by computers, telecommunications, and the Internet), especially those new economically expendable people (i.e. the masses). I feel that this is the most plausible out of all of Harari's predictions (aside from continuing divides between the elite and the masses), as people increasingly plug-in to the Internet via mobile phones, tablets, and computers (and grant giant technology corporations like Google and Apple unprecedented access to personal data). That seems to be the current trend with technology today, that humanity comes to have more value (or see itself as having more value) as a collective rather than as a collection of individuals.
Overall, Homo Deus presents a unique dystopian vision of humanity's future in the 21st century, one that utilizes a multidisciplinary approach to challenge readers' preconceptions and make them uncomfortable. However, despite my simultaneous discomfort and enjoyment of the book (and my misgivings at some of the predictions presented within it), Harari nevertheless provided me with a new point of view on the megatrends of the present and their potential future consequences. Also, what made this book both provocative and yet so successful is that the book simultaneously answered many questions and raised many, many more (allowing readers to engage in critical thinking and to come to their own conclusions). I would recommend that everyone read this book, from the merely curious everyday person to policymakers involved in making social, political, and economic decisions at the top levels, as it asks critical questions about the kind of future we want to have as a society.
Works Cited:
Harari, Yuval Noah. (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: HarperCollins.
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