Book Review: Charles Kupchan's "No One's World"

China. Its rise on the international stage has stirred a measure of controversy. The more prominent reaction to the rising economic and political power of China has been to worry about the decline of United States and the international system it has built in the wake of WWII. While Ikenberry acknowledges the growing clout of China on the international stage, he sees China as no threat to the existing international order as established. Rather, in his view, China's growing clout is precisely because of its increased buy-in to the United State's world order. 

But can the US-led order last forever? Charles A. Kupchan believes that the order of the United States and the West is on the decline, not necessarily towards a China-led system, but to a multi-polar system where no state is all-powerful in the international system.  

See below for my take on Kupchan's argument in No One's World. 


In No One’s World, Charles Kupchan provides the reader with a vision of a multipolar world order, extrapolating off trends that show developing states like China and India are poised to overtake the West. In his vision of the “coming global turn” towards multipolarity, in which no country or region is the hegemon of the international system, Kupchan sees the “rising rest” as modernizing on paths divergent to that of the West because of the impact of country-specific socioeconomic, historical and cultural factors on the method and pace of development (Kupchan, 2012, p. 3, 46, 88-89). Whereas the West rose primarily ahead of their competitors in the pre-modern era due to the emergence of a democratizing and economically invigorating force in a middle class able to challenge hierarchical forms of government in a less interdependent world and its later ability to export Western institutions and ordering principles abroad, the “rest” have tended to staved off similar regime challenges in this interdependent world forged by the West by coopting their potentially regime-challenging middle classes as standards of living improve (Kupchan, 2012, p. 46, 88). A consequence of this order Kupchan envisions is that there will be a diverse set of multiple power centers with differing socioeconomic development patterns, political systems and worldviews needing to find some way to retain multilateral cooperation despite an emerging “global dissensus” (Kupchan, 2012, p. 145). This challenge of retaining multilateral cooperation is the lens used to argue for a new consensus (Kupchan, 2012, p. 145).

Utilizing the conceptual lenses of the “problem condition,” “cognitive condition,” and “hegemonic condition” introduced by Ritterberger et al.’s (2011) text International Organization to explain the thresholds that need to be met to form international organizations, I will elucidate and evaluate Kupchan’s main argument in favor of finding a new set of organizing values and institutions for a multipolar world order that are not primarily based upon the Western values of “liberal democracy, industrial capitalism, and secular nationalism” (p. 7, 35). Ultimately, Kupchan’s argument takes a similar mostly institutionalist perspective on how international peace and security will be preserved in a multipolar world. Briefly, the main actors serving as focal points for Kupchan’s analysis are the West (primarily represented by the United States and the European Union) and rising powers or developing country actors (primarily China, India, Brazil, Russia and South Africa).

Starting with the “problem condition” in need of addressing, Kupchan recognizes the increased interdependencies yet concurrent diversity in rising world powers as the main issue presenting simultaneously an obstacle and an imperative for increased cooperation (Ritterberger et al., 2011, p. 35). Moreover, Kupchan highlights the growing awareness among Western countries towards this problem of diverse rising powers (“cognitive condition”) and the need to closely incorporate them into the existing international system (Ritterberger et al., 2011, p. 35). This acknowledgment on the part of the Western powers is important as powers like China and India are poised to close the gap in terms of military, economic and political power by the end of the twenty-first century, with their GDPs predicted to eclipse that of the United States and Europe and providing a means for growing military strength (Kupchan, 2012, p. 84). Thus, the “hegemonic condition” of the international system in transition, as Kupchan sees it, hinges on the West’s willingness and ability to peacefully shepherd the world into multipolarity where all will share “ideological tolerance coupled with economic dynamism” (Kupchan, 2012, p. 189). Ultimately, the West must bear the costs of domestic fallout as “responsible governance” (i.e. embracing a diversity of political systems if they promote citizen welfare) becomes the new ordering principle of the international system (Kupchan, 2012, p. 189). These hegemonic costs are magnified by the disunity of the West produced by domestic political polarization as in the United States or the trend towards “renationalization” of politics that threatens to harm unity and the ability of the European Union to effectively use their combined capabilities abroad (Kupchan, 2012, p. 158, 165).

While there is no doubt that the West’s power has plateaued and that the need to incorporate the rising powers into the Western-built international order as well as for the West to regain its economic vitality and cohesion going into this transition are imperatives, Kupchan’s argument in favor of an accompanying ordering principle of “responsible governance” superseding the West’s historical delegitimization of autocratic regimes is problematic in multiple respects (Kupchan, 2012, p. 189). For one, as Kupchan pointed out, the current international order is undergirded by “European conceptions of sovereignty, administration, law, diplomacy, and commerce” exported via Western imperialism (Kupchan, 2012, p. 65). As G. John Ikenberry pointed out in Liberal Leviathan, institutions are hard to change due to their ability to produce and reinforce certain organizational principles and values, meaning that the existing Western-established institutions have firmly entrenched the above Western values of consensus and multilateralism within the international order via their operation (Ikenberry, 2011). Moreover, the rise of powers of like China and India are due more likely to the benefits provided to them from joining the international club of prestigious organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Ikenberry, 2011). This dynamic produces a powerful incentive to not overturn the ordering principles of this order lest the benefits of increased economic, political, and military stature diminish (Ikenberry, 2011). Therefore, the international order has shown a remarkable ability to, per the model of “global governance” espoused by Ritterberger et al. (2011), to flexibly facilitate the “horizontal coordination” among diverse actors without the need for a supranational authority and provides hope that a transition to a multipolar order would not be as destabilizing as Kupchan posits (p. 269, 275).

This latter fact exposes the contradictory nature of Kupchan’s argument to save the international system from the destruction possible during a power transition: to save the international order, the West must undercut its own exported multilateral principles most likely to facilitate multilateral cooperation to more closely accommodate the rising powers (Kupchan, 2012, p. 192). Ultimately, Kupchan’s approach is flawed, as the Western-modeled international system already has the ordering principles of “compromise, tolerance and pluralism” built-in to the international organizations that provide arenas to peacefully settle disputes between developed and developing nation-states, while solving transnational problems multilaterally by effectively utilizing the combined resources invested in those organizations by their member states (Kupchan, 2012, p. 192). While delegitimizing nondemocratic regimes, the West still has a history of working together with these same regimes to solve pressing international issues within the confines of the current order.  Effectively, the proposed principle of “responsible governance” is rendered moot if the West can simply expand on already existing principles of cooperation by further incorporating these rising powers into the international system, creating a higher stake for all in the system’s overall preservation (Ikenberry, 2011; Kupchan, 2012, p. 189).

Moreover, aside from the need for a critical mass of actors and a common perception of the nature of the problem and its solutions, institutional change would be very difficult to undertake even for future hegemons due to the path dependency of international organizations reflecting a different consensus reached at a specific historical juncture that can only be overridden by achieving a new consensus (which requires considerable expenditures of social, political, economic, and diplomatic capital and resources). In other words, the institutional structure as it exists is not overly dependent on the fluctuations or perceived credibility of Western power and to some degree is self-perpetuating (Ikenberry, 2011; Ritterberger et al., 2011). Therefore, the inclusion of a new “responsible governance” standard may not be necessary; to some extent, it has always existed within the current order (Kupchan, 2012, p. 189). Thus, the existing Western-built order has successfully accommodated rising powers to date and provides a solution to the “problem, cognitive, and hegemonic” conditions both Ikenberry and Kupchan have recognized in their narratives about the future of the international order (Ritterberger, et al., 2011, p. 35).

In conclusion, while it is an engaging read, Kupchan’s No One’s World nevertheless poses contradictory arguments in his thesis that the coming multipolar world order will require the West to undercut its own order in favor of embracing a largely redundant principle of “responsible governance” to more closely accommodate the political diversity of the rising powers along with a similar economic revitalization to regain its capacity to shepherd the coming transition (Kupchan, 2012, p. 189). For the latter reason, readers may find the book to be hard to follow because of its internal contradictions, despite its well-written introduction providing the context for his later arguments in concisely cataloging the rise of the Western powers over their counterparts in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and the concurrent trends predicting the plateauing of Western power. Nevertheless, despite the contradictory (and redundant) nature of Kupchan’s arguments in providing solutions to peacefully transition to a more multipolar world, Kupchan’s No One’s World presents an intriguing narrative that forces readers to not discount the challenges posed to the flexibility of the international system in terms of rising powers’ political and cultural diversity. 


Works Cited:

Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Kupchan, C. A. (2012). No One’s World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ritterberger, V., Zangl, B., & Kruck, A. (2011). International Organization (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

On Peacebuilding

In the early twenty-first century, the United States has engaged increasingly in a foreign policy of democracy exportation to other countries. This often was done through military intervention in a country (for example, Iraq in 2003) and then involved various international actors like the United Nations in order to try and build institutions that would provide for a stable democratic state. What is the rationale for such a foreign policy? Why is it so controversial? Can instilling democracy in other countries help ensure long-term peace in post-conflict countries? With these questions in mind, this week I will explore the topic of peacebuilding, or a long-term institution building after countries have ceased often intra-state conflicts (i.e. post peace-agreement), and its operationalization on the international stage as influenced strongly by Western actors like the United States.

This international impulse emerging towards peacebuilding through democratization emerged in the United States prominently in the advent of the Bush Doctrine during the Bush administration of 2001-2009. Democratization as ensuring long-term peace essentially relies on the logic of "democratic peace" theory, in which democracies are less likely to go to war with other democracies. In the wake of 9/11, the Bush administration articulated a new vision of foreign policy in which the United States' new role on the world stage was to help spread democracy at the very least and democracy and capitalism in the best case scenario in order to help with America's national security.

One of the main purposes of the United Nations (UN), one of the largest international governmental organizations (IGOs) with 194 nation-state members, from its inception is to maintain international peace and security. The primary mechanism that the UN has sought to maintain the peace is the mechanism of peacekeeping, which entails brokering an end to primarily intrastate conflicts that have increased in incidence post WWII. However, the international community has struggled to find a means to maintain the peace after brokering an end to these conflicts. In 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s “Agenda for Peace” report introduced to the international community the concept of “post-conflict peacebuilding” defined as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Barnett et al., 2007, p. 35). The main responses to this challenge in the international system has taken on a form of peacebuilding through state-building that involves the setting up and maintenance of democratic institutions modeled largely around the Western liberal institutional model in order to promote socioeconomic and political stability. This has put significant strain on the organizational resources the UN possesses and also has generated much controversy.

The main organs in the UN responsible for peacebuilding activities are the Special Representatives for the Secretary General (SRSGs), the Peacebuilding Commission (established in 2005), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (PBPU). Underneath the jurisdiction of the UN Economic and Social Council (UN-ECOSOC) and the UN Secretary-General (UNSG), these bodies (representing 31 UN member states) also form a partnership with organizations within and outside the UN, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to aid in carrying out its peacebuilding programs. While the DPKO provides oversight to the conduct of peacebuilding missions and the Peacebuilding Fund a portion of the needed resources, the PBPU and recently established Peacebuilding Commission largely serve as administrative and advisory organs that seek to develop “best practices” and “standard operating procedures” for peacebuilding missions in order to promote operational success and efficiency. Success of peacebuilding missions is defined by a basic benchmark of a country not relapsing into violent conflict after five years of the conclusion of a peace agreement. Moreover, as with other UN organizations, member state contributions, including monetary donations and troop/personnel contributions are largely voluntary.

In addition to existing organizations addressing the new prerogatives of peacebuilding on the international level are various country-specific organizations that address peacebuilding related concerns, such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Japan Development Agency (JDA), to name a few. Further supplementing IGOs’ operational capacities and resources is the partnerships of these international and country-specific organizations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the ground in various countries. These partnerships serve to reduce the burden of peacebuilding missions on the organizations while providing critical connections with civil society and local administrative bodies in order to promote desired political changes.

Now, we will see why peacebuilding is so controversial today and why it has not been as successful when put into practice.

Peacebuilding has proven to be a complex and controversial undertaking, which ultimately is reflected in the convoluted and semi-fragmented global governance that exists in this area. Not aiding organizational coherency and coordination is the fact that peacebuilding is a relatively recent phenomenon and that different organizations in and outside of the UN define and operationalize peacebuilding differently. In addition, complicating matters is the potential Western-liberal bias of the peacebuilding missions, the rising global demand accompanying an increase in intrastate conflicts, and the fact that the UN is dependent on its member states’ contributions.

Because peacebuilding is uncharted territory for an organization predicated on non-intervention and self-determination, the UN particularly is hampered by its member states (including the United States) that are reluctant to grant the UN further authority to intervene in state affairs to build sustainable institutions in post-conflict states. In practice, this means that the UN is often lacking sufficient monetary, technical, and personnel resources for its missions and must rely on and attempt to coordinate with a complex patchwork of NGOs and other non-UN organizations to operationalize its mandate. Particularly controversial was a proposal to create an “early warning system” or an Early Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) as a form of “preventive diplomacy,” which would entail a large-scale intelligence exchange across various UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding bodies (Benner & Rotmann, 2008, p. 10). Therefore, many of the decisions within and across UN bodies are made per intergovernmental bargaining and consensus, which has reduced the “formal budgetary and disciplinary powers” that the SRSGs have in incentivizing diverse actors to effectively coordinate on various missions as well as provide adequate operational resources (Benner & Rotmann, 2008, p. 52; Ritterberger et al., 2011). In other words, inter- and intra-agency coordination has not been sufficiently addressed and has hampered the ability of the UN to promote international security and peace.

Aside from consensus and intergovernmental decision-making processes, another factor serving to harm effectiveness in this area of global governance is the variance in definition of peacebuilding across various organizational levels. For example, while the UN Secretariat organs see peacebuilding as addressing both security and socioeconomic concerns, the World Bank focuses primarily on peacebuilding through infrastructure and reconstruction projects. Overall, because of the high degree of specialization among the different organizations, coordination problems are exacerbated and (ironically) the long-term institution building concerns are neglected in favor of a prioritization of reducing conflict recurrence. This can prove detrimental, because democratic transitions can prove to be highly destabilizing when institutions are designed poorly or are not tailored to country-specific contexts (such as in the cookie-cutter application of Western models of liberal democracy) and fail to promote peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms.

Overall, the global governance in peacebuilding is highly decentralized and in the process of maturation due to the recent nature of the peacebuilding concept and the above-outlined coordination problems that hamper effective long-term coordination among various IGOs, NGOs, and great powers. Ultimately, as in other areas of global governance, states are reluctant to give up more of their sovereignty in favor of strengthening IGOs like the UN. While a middle ground can be reached to balance sovereignty and organizational effectiveness, this has not been reached in the area of peacebuilding as states so far have been reluctant to grant organs like the UN Peacebuilding Commission the authority to coordinate more effectively across state and organizational boundaries and because the Peacebuilding Commission’s membership is restricted to 31 UN member states. Additionally, to aid in better understanding IGO-NGO cooperation and in the hope of solving its problems, the literature would benefit from in-depth explorations of any existing partnerships between peacebuilding IGOs and NGOs and their effectiveness in creating sustainable peace with limited resources and possibly conflicting operational goals.

Lessons learned? In the future, the United States and other actors must be wary of imposing Western models of democracy in the process of foreign policy conduct and international peacebuilding efforts and must find an acceptable balance between ensuring it's (and other states') sovereignty while granting organizations like the UN sufficient authority (or at the very least, a better ability to cooperate with NGOs and civil society organizations) to help maintain a long-term peace for everyone.

Works Cited:

Barnett, M., Hunjoon, K., O’Donnell, M., & Sitea, L. (2007). Peacebuilding: What is in a Name? Global Governance, 13(1), 35-58.

Benner, T., & Rotmann, P. (2008). Learning to Learn? UN Peacebuilding and the Challenges of Building a Learning Organization. Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 2(1), 43-62.

Costly, A. (n.d.). The Bush Doctrine. Retrieved April 01, 2017, from http://www.crf-usa.org/war-in-iraq/bush-doctrine.html

Doyle, M., & Sambanis, N. (2000). International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis. The American Political Science Review, 94(4), 779-801.

Paris, R. (2002). International Peacebuilding and the Mission Civilisatrice. Review of International Studies, 28(4), 637-656.

Ritterberger, V., Zangl, B., & Kruck, A. (2011). International Organization (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Samuels, K. (2006). Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making. (Symposium: UN Reform). Chicago Journal of International Law, 6(2), 663-682.

Von Billerbeck, S. (2015). "Local Ownership and UN Peacebuilding: Discourse Versus Operationalization." Global Governance, 21(2), 299-315.

Book Review: G. John Ikenberry's "Liberal Leviathan"

China. Its rise on the international stage has stirred a measure of controversy. The more prominent reaction to the rising economic and political power of China has been to worry about the decline of United States and the international system it has built in the wake of WWII. While Ikenberry acknowledges the growing clout of China on the international stage, he sees China as no threat to the existing international order as established. Rather, in his view, China's growing clout is precisely because of its increased buy-in to the United State's world order. But can the US-led order last forever?

See below for my take on Ikenberry's argument.  


G. John Ikenberry’s Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order posits that there is a crisis of authority in the post WWII international system that was built and maintained by the United States of the system’s own making. The United States had emerged out of WWII the dominant power of the international system. Thus, an anomalous lack of a competing great power or balancing coalition meant that the United States had wide latitude to shape the international order according to its preferences. Ikenberry outlines three “logics of order” that the United States could have chosen to build its new world order upon after WWII, including command (the imposition of rules on others through force), balance (relative power equity between states), and consent (based upon the establishment of multilateral institutions and rules) (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 76). Ultimately, the United States chose to shape the new order based on consent because it recognized that it would not always retain its status as hegemon.

Thus, the building and shaping of an international system of multilateral institutions that reflected its liberal values (democracy, free markets, cooperation, human rights) may constrain its ability to act unilaterally in the short-term, but would serve as a long-term insurance policy to prevent other rising powers from fundamentally altering the system the U.S. established. However, today’s international system has seen an erosion of Westphalian notions of state sovereignty, with increased acceptance of interference in other states’ affairs to confront transnational problems as well as the threat of rising powers like India and China. Ikenberry thus sees a need for renegotiation of the terms of U.S. hegemony in the international order as necessary to offset the crisis of leadership, offering three potential paths the international system could take. It is these three paths that I evaluate more closely, as these paths represent the core of the argument made in the book.

Ikenberry presents three paths that the international system could take: a “post-hegemonic” liberal order, a “renegotiated” American liberal order, and a complete fracturing of the current international order (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 303-313). While the first two paths entail some form of continuing liberal international order, with the United States retaining most of its hegemonic influence in the “renegotiated” order as opposed to the multipolar “post hegemonic” liberal order, a fracturing of the order entails no guarantee of continued American or liberal influence (Ikenberry, 2011 p. 303-313). While his reasoning for the viability of the first two potential orders is sound, as multipolar systems with more equitable power-sharing have proven to be relatively stable (i.e. the logic of deterrence through power equity), I would dispute his reasoning that in all cases core elements of the American liberal order would persist in some form. As aforementioned, Ikenberry defines these “core elements” around broad conceptions of open markets, democracy, the new “social bargain” (an economic safety net), multiple other forms of interdependencies and the upholding of certain universal values like those concerning human rights (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 169-186). Additionally, Ikenberry outlines in detail how these key organizational features could be preserved in each order. I will introduce his arguments before providing a critique of his faith in the durability of the international order.

Starting with the “post-hegemonic” order, Ikenberry sees the United States retaining indirect influence as its powers wane as becoming one of many powers governing more “publicly,” without most of the special rights and privileges it retains in organizations like the Security Council (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 302). I interpreted this kind of system to largely be a non-negotiable multipolarity. Similarly, a “renegotiated” liberal order would involve the United States retaining limited hegemonic control, limited to such areas as serving the role of security provider (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 306). Moreover, this renegotiated order would serve to place further constraints on U.S. use of unilateral power. While the differences between the latter orders were not made explicitly clear, I interpreted the difference to be the source of power constraint on the United States. In a post-hegemonic order, the U.S. exercise of power would be constrained primarily by multipolar balancing (reduced power differentials) versus a more voluntary acquiescence to multilateral institutional restraints and bargains. Lastly, a complete breakdown of the international order into rival, mercantilist blocs entails a complete shift to multipolarity, whereas the previous two orders would merely mean a redistribution of unipolar power from the U.S. to other states. In this scenario, the international community could resemble the Cold War era great power rivalries and spheres of influence in terms of potential security competition.

It is with this latter order that I dispute Ikenberry’s argument for the resiliency of the international system to survive such a shift to dangerous multipolarity in which Ikenberry remarks that the liberal order could instead “evolve” based on how the world chooses to respond to “the pressures and incentives for change…in regard to the way roles and responsibilities are allocated in the system” (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 332). A world divided into rival blocs does not have the same institutional mechanisms through which to facilitate cooperation and minimize interactional uncertainty through the mutual constraining of states’ abilities to act unilaterally under the pressures of the security dilemma. If any such institutions or mechanisms exist, I would argue that such entities would be very limited and would largely follow the logic of security competition in a more uncertain, anarchic environment where “there is no supranational” or semi-autonomous supreme authority (like an institution) “capable of wielding overwhelming power” to hold competing actors in check (Ritterberger et al., 2011, p. 16). Moreover, the same incentives to establish predictable mechanisms of relations would not be present in a critical mass (merely limited to relations within spheres) and thus contribute to the breakdown of the core aspects of the international system that are based on transparency and multilateralism in part due to the cohesive power that common values have in promoting cooperation in the first place. Mercantilism by definition is inherently exploitative and not grounded in cooperative values so much as imperial hierarchical values Ikenberry describes in which cooperation itself with the core on the part of the weaker states is mandatory.

In other words, Machiavellian realism would prove to be the better paradigm for organizing and analyzing this particular system in comparison to a liberal outlook. A liberal outlook could ignore security competition pressures between nuclear powers while conflating the limited aspects of cooperation present in such a system, such as the potentially imperial “hub-and-spoke” relations between the power centers of each bloc and between the cores of certain blocs that would be motivated by unconstrained self-interest (Ikenberry, 2011, p. 90, 133). In contrast, a merely reformed or post-hegemonic liberal international order would at least provide the safeguards against the unilateral use of coercive force when power is to some degree diffused among the different actors in a collective security setting. For example, the incentives among states around nuclear disarmament present in today’s order or a reformed order could be weakened in a such a setting in which institutions do not exist on large enough a scale to provide critical conflict mediation services among states to prevent a runaway arms race. It is in those first two hypothetical cases that I find Ikenberry’s reasoning, based mostly off of a broad conception of liberalism, to be the soundest. However, in the end, the core arguments of his book do not always hold up due to his overwhelming faith in the long-term viability of a liberal world order in some form, even in more mercantilist visions of world order.

In conclusion, Ikenberry’s Liberal Leviathan presents an engaging read overall, despite repetition in parts of the book concerning his theoretical buildup of key concepts and history before presenting his central thesis on the visions of the future international order. It is this theory-heavy first half of the book that may alienate more general audiences. Despite the theoretical thicket in the first half, this piece provides an important cornerstone for students of international relations rather than a more general readership, especially in consideration of the hypothetical future paths of the international order. This theoretical buildup, while lengthy, provides a critical exploration of many major theoretical perspectives in international relations, allowing readers to come to their own conclusions about the future of the existing international order. While offering suggestions to preserve the existing liberal international order largely around the lines of renegotiating America’s continued hegemonic role, at the very least, Liberal Leviathan is sure to provoke a critical and vigorous debate among students and scholars of international relations.
 
Works Cited:
Ikenberry, G. J. (2011). Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Ritterberger, V., Zangl, B., & Kruck, A. (2011). International Organization (2nd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

On the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A One State or Two State Solution?

Recently, President Donald Trump extended an invitation to Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to meet with him at the White House to discuss the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This comes after a recent reversal on the part of the White House in regards to America's support for the two-state solution and proposals to move the US embassy in Israel to the hotly-contested territory of East Jerusalem. What are the implications of this shift? What would a one-state policy look like? I will examine both potential solutions on their merits in the wake of recent events.

First I will define each of the policies, starting with the two-state solution. Basically, the two-term solution would entail the coexistence of an independent Israeli state and an independent Palestinian state. The borders for these two states would be based upon 1967 ceasefire lines in the currently Israeli-occupied West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem territories. Palestine would be formed from those latter territories, while Israel would withdraw from those territories and would retain their statehood as well within those borders. This policy currently has the backing of several prominent groups of states at the international level, including the UN, Arab League, European Union (EU), and Russia. While the U.S. has officially supported this policy for decades, recent statements by President Trump have put serious question marks around the new US stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This proposal is seen as better for giving both groups some degree of self-determination and (hopefully) de-escalating the conflict (i.e. reduction in the use of terrorist tactics or other violent means by both groups in favor of negotiation-based dispute settlement at the very least and perhaps long-term peace). Advocates of this solution see this as a solution to improve the security situation in the Middle East in general (as Arab states have historically not been thrilled about Israel's existence as a state along with a subsequent denial of self-determination for Palestinian Arabs).

On the other hand, a one-state policy is pretty self-explanatory. There would be one state, containing both Palestinians and Israelis. What is clear from the outset is that both groups would have to coexist within existing state borders. Also complicating this is the debate over whether the state would still be Jewish and democratic or merely secular and neither group having a majority. Yet another complicating factor is the fierce religious disagreements over holy sites in Jerusalem along with continuing Jewish settlement expansion into disputed territories. This stance is rooted in the fact that many Palestinians were made refugees in 1948 when they were kicked out of their homes in the early days of Israeli statehood; naturally, Palestinians want to go back to their land and keep Israelis from expanding further into territory they regard as theirs. (For a helpful guide to the very complicated history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, I recommend Sandy Tolan's Lemon Tree). To be fair though, both sides have dug in their heels in terms of their claims to the same land and this has made any kind of negotiations nearly impossible in regards to territory for a future Palestinian state.

From the view of many international observers, such a tenuous coexistence in a single-state "solution" might undermine the state in the absence of robust dispute settlement mechanisms and adequate representation of Palestinians in the Knesset (Israel's version of Congress) or some other hypothetical legislative body, in the very unlikely event the state of Israel is renamed to accommodate both peoples. Hardly any representation in social, political, and economic institutions for one group (i.e. the Palestinians) makes intrastate conflict that much more likely. This puts both groups of people at risk in the short and long-term, with neither group getting what they deserve: a state of their own where they do not have to fear frequent violence such as terrorist attacks and can live in peace. All in all, there are too many hypotheticals for a one-state solution in many respects, which makes the United States' apparent deviation from the two-state policy it has supported for decades even more alarming from a security and humanitarian perspective.

While some regard the two-state policy as utopian, non-realistic and near impossible due to current circumstances (increased Israeli settlement expansion into occupied territories, continuing violence by terrorist groups on both sides, contemplations of a third Intifada or uprising), it remains the best solution in my mind for all sides involved (including the United States and its allies in Europe and elsewhere). The two-state solution is not by any means perfect (it would require the same kinds of debates about how to shape the state in general for either group), but remains the most viable compared to the one-state solution. It would be my hope that President Trump reevaluates his stance on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for the good of all sides.


Sources Cited:

BBC News. (2017, March 10). Trump Middle East: Palestinian Leader Invited to White House. Retrieved March 8, 2017, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-39237320.

Fisher, Max. (2016, December 29). The Two-State Solution: What It Is and Why It Hasn't Happened. Retrieved March 8, 2017, from https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world/middleeast/israel-palestinians-two-state-solution.html?_r=0.

Tolan, Sandy. (2015). The Lemon Tree: An Arab, a Jew, and the Heart of the Middle East. New York: Bloomsbury.

Going Nuclear: The Good and Bad of Deterrence

The United States has recently been in the news again, this time concerning the Trump administration's championing of the US building up its nuclear arsenal and a rejection of a new START nuclear disarmament treaty between the United States and Russia. This has serious implications for the world aside from signalling a departure from the foreign policy precedent of gradual nuclear disarmament. What is the potential rationale for such a policy shift? What are its implications? This week, I examine the logic of deterrence theory and point out its pros and cons in light of recent events.

Currently, there are over 15,000 nuclear missiles in the world, with the United States and Russia currently possessing over 93% of the world's total nuclear weapons (a leftover from the Cold War era). Besides the United States and Russia, only six other countries are confirmed to have nuclear weapons: China, India, Israel, France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and North Korea. (Note: While North Korea has conducted nuclear weapons tests, it is not officially known whether or not North Korea's nuclear program has advanced to the point of being able to miniaturize a nuclear warhead so that it fits on a missile). These countries, both inside and outside the nuclear club (i.e. the US, UK, China, France, and Russia), possess nuclear weapons due in large part to the logic of deterrence theory.

Deterrence theory states that multiple states possessing nuclear weapons will have significant disincentives to use them against other actors because of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In other words, countries don't want to fire on other countries if they know that there will be retaliation that will ensure both sides get destroyed. This theory, like other international relations theory, relies on the basic assumption that actors (i.e. states) are rational and wish to optimize their security in order to ensure their ultimate survival. Because there has been no nuclear war yet, does this mean that deterrence theory is sound and that nuclear weapons are the key to peace and prosperity in the international system?

While it may appear to have held up so far (we're all still here), there are critical flaws in the theory (like any other theory). One major one is that in a world in which non-state actors like terrorist groups pose transnational security threats, the logic of deterrence theory breaks down. This is because non-state actors cannot be easily located and some terrorists don't act in the assumed rational manner (i.e. they may not care about their survival, as seen with suicide bombers). Moreover, as more countries acquire nuclear weapons despite international treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there is a greater chance that terrorists could acquire knowledge about nuclear weapons and use that against the rest of the international system.

I would argue that this latter risk is amplified with calls by the Trump administration to boost the US nuclear arsenal (potentially prompting other countries to possibly abandon the international nuclear disarmament regime). Secondly, the logic of deterrence doesn't hold in situations where someone accidentally launches nuclear weapons, misreads the intentions of other actors, or where leaders are not behaving rationally. Lastly, I would argue that the logic of deterrence is shaky also when it comes to instilling a potentially false sense of security.

There has to be a tipping point. This tipping point could come from any of the above situations I have outlined. Frankly, that scares me. Nuclear disarmament is probably the best way to prevent tensions from escalating between countries (despite the logic of deterrence) or between non-state actors and countries, instead of constantly being in an arms race to stay "on top of the pack." Arms races typically don't end well. Look at what almost happened in the Cold War. Deterrence theory itself almost gave way to an accidental launch, after all.



Sources Cited:

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39073303
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/fact-sheet-who-has-nuclear-weapons-how-many-do-they-n548481
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699
https://www.wagingpeace.org/ten-serious-flaws-in-nuclear-deterrence-theory/

On the Media

{The first in a series of case studies looking at the media and democracy.}

Recently, there has been many headlines where President Trump has decried the "dishonesty" of the media and that media organizations are essentially tools of the left in an overall "corrupt system" that is in need of fixing. While the media and Washington do have a symbiotic relationship of sorts, this relationship is not as cozy as some would claim. This week I write to shine a light on the critical role that media organizations and journalists play in helping to maintain a healthy democracy like ours.

One of the cornerstones of a functioning, stable democracy is an independent (i.e. not state-owned as many media organizations are in say, Russia or China) media. Some scholars have gone so far as to call the media the "fourth branch of government," in a reference to its importance in providing critical, albeit somewhat informal checks and balances on government and its exercise of power (Bennett, 2007; Cook, 1998). Essentially, the media serves the role of watchdog, helping to keep the government accountable to its people through its reporting (especially in an age of "alternative facts" that can create harmful, false realities) and to call it out when it is overstepping the bounds of its authority or acting in a way contrary to the will of the people.

Again, I acknowledge that the media does not function in a complete vacuum. However, the reporter-politician/official relationship is a two-way street. Reporters depend on government officials or politicians for the content of their stories and government officials/politicians need the media in order to reach wide audiences with their messages (i.e. the people). Like all relationships, there is friction between the two parties, as government officials feel the media can be intrusive, especially around potentially classified matters of national security. Meanwhile, reporters can feel that government officials are hiding critical information, especially when Freedom of Information Act (FIA) requests are denied on the grounds of national security.

In this way, the relationship is a feedback loop that can reinforce frictions between the two parties, with government officials and the media calling out each other in a battle of narratives. The outsider's view of this relationship can leave them rightly confused or even embittered towards the media, as the government has incredible powers to shape messaging in a way that it is able to portray itself as a victim of overly zealous attack journalism. The media's responses to such charges sometimes do not help that perception either.

It is this great amount of power that government has over messaging and framing issues that lately has had me worried. President Trump seems to be exploiting an underlying anger that people have towards the media by using his position one of the most visible people in the world to decry the media as "corrupt" and "against the people." Other frequent charges have centered around news organizations spreading "fake news." (The irony of this messaging method is that the president took advantage of the vast audience media organizations of all stripes report to in spreading his message that the media are not to be trusted.) By delegitimizing the news as an actor that actually runs contrary to democracy, President Trump is setting a dangerous precedent.

If people do not trust the news and are told to trust exclusively in the government and its messaging, that comes dangerously close to living in a society where government powers are not checked and opposition coalitions are systematically targeted. In other words, those civil and political liberties that we treasure can be taken away if we're not careful. In such situations, competing ideas and beliefs can be quashed by a government and tyranny of the majority becomes a very real possibility. The media represents those diverse ideas, the alternative ways of looking at problems and solving them. Diversity of ideas is one of the defining features of a democracy, after all. Therefore, do not discount the media so easily. By keeping watch over the government and providing (and rightly defending) a necessary platform for the expression of a multitude of ideas, the people can hold the government accountable. Especially when an administration like Trump's tries to circumvent the checks and balances that have held our democracy together.



Sources Cited:

Bennett, W. L. & Graber, D.A. (2007). News: the politics of illusion (6th ed.). New York: Pearson Longman.

Cook, T. E. (1998). Governing with the news: The news media as a political institution (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39018096

On Immigration & Refugees

Immigration. Refugees. It's two of the most controversial topics in the United States right now, as President Donald Trump goes to court to defend a series of executive orders seeking to halt refugees and immigrants from coming from seven Muslim-majority countries. With all the confusion and "alternative facts" floating around, I thought I would look into the refugee screening process and the immigration executive orders and set the record straight. I make the argument that these executive orders, rather than making the country safer from outside threats like terrorism, actually puts our country more at risk.

Starting with the refugee screening process, the United States has one of the most strict refugee screening processes in the world. After undergoing preliminary screening, asylum cases first arrive for initial processing by one of the State Department's nine Resettlement Support Centers (RSCs). The RSCs do additional background checks and collect more information. Then, multiple United States security or intelligence organizations (such as the Department of Homeland Security) review the RSC case info when conducting multiple interviews and even further screening for any red flags. This includes biometric testing, cultural testing, and more. Considering all the resources the United States has at is disposal, including help from allied country intelligence organizations, it is extremely rare that anything serious will be missed by the screening process. All in all, this process takes roughly 12-24 months. (For further details, see the links below.)

So, to give some further perspective, the chances of being killed by a refugee in a terrorist attack amount roughly to a 1 in 3.6 billion chance/year. This implies that the bigger danger perhaps would come from so-called "home-grown" terrorists, or United States citizens that are radicalized. The measures that President Trump is putting into place, including an indefinite ban on acceptance of Syrian refugees and a temporary ban on people coming from seven Muslim majority countries (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen), minus those that are United States permanent residents, might not actually make the country safer than it already is. 

The toxic anti-immigrant and refugee rhetoric during the 2016 presidential election and these restrictive (perhaps isolationist) immigration and refugee policies goes contrary to our country's very foundations in being welcoming towards immigrants and others escaping persecution. Also, these policies only serve to feed into the narratives of terrorist groups like ISIS use to recruit further members. Lastly, while these measures are being debated on their legality, there is the potential for these measures, meant to provide security, lead us onto a slippery slope where the rights of some groups are trampled on for the short-term benefit of the others. 

And that, that is not democratic. It's not who we are as a country.

Sources cited: 

https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions

Infographic, resettlement process (State Department)

http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/immigration-stats-by-the-numbers-trnd/ (Immigration/Refugee Stats)

http://www.politifact.com/california/statements/2017/feb/01/ted-lieu/odds-youll-be-killed-terror-attack-america-refugee/