Case Evaluation: Syria

{Syria continues to be in the news as the Trump administration continues to mull over whether or not U.S. troops should largely be pulled from Syria, which currently is embroiled in a horrific civil war resulting from an ill-fated attempt by rebel forces to oust the current regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Not to mention U.S., British and French air strikes launched on suspected chemical weapons in Damascus and Homs in retaliation to a suspected chemical weapons attack in Douma by the Syrian government. This week, to provide additional context on the Syrian conflict and the thorny issues of intervention with or without military force and sovereignty that remain to this day, I flashback to an analysis I conducted of President Obama's decision to conduct air strikes on Syrian territory in 2011. How the Trump administration plans to handle the thorny situation long-term remains to be seen.}

Background:

The case of Syria demonstrates the extent to which globalization has increasingly internationalized civil wars and illustrates the complexity of international terrorism and anti-terrorism partnerships. Specifically, the outbreak of armed conflict between Russian-backed government forces of President Bashar al-Assad, United States-supported Kurdish and Syrian rebels (Free Syrian Army), and various terrorist groups is considered an outgrowth of the instability brought by the regional Arab Spring movement of 2011 in the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab Spring movement of 2011, widely seen as a popular uprising against authoritarian governments, toppled many regimes seen as oppressive. However, in Syria, this coup was not successful and the Assad regime has responded by cracking down against his opposition, seen as a loose coalition of rebels and terrorist groups such as the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State (IS). The country is presently in a state of civil war, as terrorist groups took advantage of power vacuums in Syria and elsewhere in the Middle East after the 2011 protests.

Adding to the complexity of the civil-war situation was the use of sarin nerve gas, one of many internationally-banned chemical weapons underneath the 1925 Geneva Convention, against civilians in the Syrian capital, Damascus, on August 21st, 2013, by the Syrian government, in which 1,423 people were believed by U.S. intelligence to have been killed. The use of chemical weapons put additional pressure on President Obama to take decisive action in Syria, as use of chemical weapons against civilians was a “red line” for possible United States military action in the country considered to be a state-sponsor of terrorism. Additionally, the president was also constrained by a deadlocked UN Security Council in terms of action on Syria. Previously, the United States had maintained an indirect approach to Syria that involved maintenance and expansion of joint US-EU-Turkey-Arab League economic sanctions on Syria, support of a UN weapons-inspection regime, and support of the rebels in the form of humanitarian aid to achieve possible democracy in the country; prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs); and fight terrorism as part of the larger international “War on Terror.”

In the wake of the August incident, President Obama announced his updated strategy of targeting Syrian government military positions, but stopped short of a commitment of ground troops, no doubt in part due to the war weariness induced by previous unsuccessful operations in Iraq and Afghanistan taken in response to terrorism. Additionally, President Obama announced his seeking of formal support from Congress to authorize the Syria military operation at a time in which public skepticism over Middle East-interventionism was mirrored in the divided legislature, especially among Republican lawmakers critical of the president’s response to the Syrian crisis. Around the same time, a similar vote in Britain’s parliament to authorize the use of military force in Syria failed. Thus, to assuage a skeptical Congress, the American public, American allies abroad, and the United Nations (with both domestic and international actors retaining varying degrees of isolationist or internationalist sentiment), President Obama announced the limited military operation (purposefully not terming the operation a “war”) in a strings-attached manner, seeking to toe the line regarding international law and the US War Powers Act (1973).

Evaluation:

To explain the president’s decision-making on the Syria case, in which he supported limited military strikes against the Assad regime, I will utilize the realist and emotional/cognitive perspectives to enumerate the security interests at play and the contrasts in perspective in Congress and the Obama administration.

In the context of international anti-terrorism efforts, securing Syria by attempting to oust an oppressive regime along with maintaining progress towards reducing the amount of land (and potential WMDs) held by terrorist groups such as IS reflects a realist national-security interest on behalf of the United States. This strategic prerogative was passed on to the Obama administration through the “War on Terror.” Moreover, in terms of the post-9/11 foreign policy strategy of democratization in the Middle East, reflected in the United States’ support of the Free Syrian Army, lack of response to the crisis (especially the chemical weapons attack) would indicate the United States was not only unwilling to back up its democratic ideals, but also would allow a dictator (supported by rival Russia) to get away with violating international law. This in turn, it was reasoned by some in the administration and Congress, could embolden Syria, Iran, North Korea and various non-state groups in their proliferation of WMDs and thus threaten America and its allies. However, not all saw the situation the same.

For example, President Obama, in his advocation of a limited military strike in Syria seems to recall the failure of U.S. ground missions in Afghanistan and Iraq that ultimately ended up contributing to the instability of the Middle East in concert with the Arab Spring. In his public announcement, Obama hints that past interventions in the Middle East of a preemptive nature produced greater security threats to the United States. Additionally, the President seems to have intertwined matters of national security with matters of morality, citing similarly to Congress that American nonintervention against the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons against civilians not only would embolden America’s enemies, but also would send a message that the United States no longer committed itself to its ideals and the upholding of international law. Therefore, inaction would produce greater national security consequences in the undermining of U.S. credibility abroad. Yet, the president continued to hope for a diplomatic solution to prevail on Syria.

Meanwhile, in Congress, conflicting analogical reasoning among prominent individuals seemed to have also played a great role in President Obama’s decision-making. Many members of Congress across party-lines largely echoed public concerns about the degree to which national security was threatened and the wisdom of committing U.S. ground troops. Seeming to similarly recall the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which security arguments were put forward in regards to needing to act against unstable dictators with WMD-development aspirations to garner support, many members of Congress thus expressed doubts about the proposed military plan. A sizable majority of Congress seemed to advocate the further use of diplomacy alone or as part of a more comprehensive Syria strategy rather than resorting to potentially unilateral military force on its own to confront the Assad regime. Thus, to preserve political flexibility while seeking to still act on his principles and the security interests in Syria, President Obama thus made a tentative military commitment dependent on Congressional approval.

Ultimately, while many government actors seemed to grasp the national security concerns at play in Syria, the conflicted analogical reasoning of key parts of the legislative and executive branches towards Syria (and the resulting tentativeness on the foreign policy front) seem to have played an equal or greater role in the president’s decision-making to carry out the limited air strikes versus choosing inaction or a wholesale commitment of boots on the ground.


Works Cited:

BBC News (2013, September 24). “Syria Chemical Attack: What We Know.” Retrieved November 18, 2016 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-23927399.

BBC News (2016, December 5). “Syria Profile: Timeline.” Retrieved December 5, 2016 from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-14703995.

BBC News (2018, April 17). Syria Air Strikes: Theresa May Says Action 'Moral and Legal'. Retrieved April 18, 2018, from http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-43775728?intlink_from_url=http://www.bbc.com/news/topics/cme1yzdkllxt/syria-air-strikes&link_location=live-reporting-story.

Blanchard, C. M., & Sharp, J. M. (2013, September 12). “Possible U.S. Intervention in Syria: Issues for Congress.” Retrieved November 18, 2016 from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43201.pdf.
CIA World Factbook (2016). “Syria.” Retrieved November 16, 2016 from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html.

Hayden, C. (2013, August 31). “President Obama's Decision on Syria.” Retrieved November 15, 2016 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/08/31/president-obamas-decision-syria.

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The New York Times (2013, August 31). “Obama Seeks Approval by Congress for Strike in Syria. Retrieved December 1, 2016 from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html.

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United States. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Middle East North Africa, author. (2013). Breaking the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nexus: Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific and the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, April 11, 2013. (United States. Congress. House of Representatives. HR hrg.; 1-89). Retrieved December 3, 2016 from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113hhrg80364/pdf/CHRG-113hhrg80364.pdf.

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, author. (2014). The Authorization of Use of Force in Syria: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, September 3, 2013. (United States. Congress. Senate. S. hrg.; 113-479). Retrieved December 3, 2016 from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg91222/html/CHRG-113shrg91222.htm.

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, author. (2014). U.S. Policy Toward Syria: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Thirteenth Congress, first session, April 11, 2013. (United States. Congress. Senate. S. hrg.; 113-197). Retrieved December 4, 2016 from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg86861/pdf/CHRG-113shrg86861.pdf.

United States Department of State (2014, March 20). “U.S. Relations with Syria.” Retrieved November 18, 2016 from http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm.

White House Office of the Press Secretary (2013, August 30). “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government's Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013.” Retrieved November 16, 2016 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21.

White House Office of the Press Secretary (2013, August 31). “Statement by the President on Syria.” Retrieved November 16, 2016 from https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria.