Because the constitutional and institutional design choices are extensive, I will focus on one of the most crucial dynamics that determine a democracy’s long-term viability: executive-legislative relations (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 449-450). To start with, the main goal of a democracy is to provide for the needs of its citizens. Whether a country is coming out of violent conflict or had an authoritarian past, one of the first concerns is what system of government the constitution will enshrine: a presidential or parliamentary system. This choice will define the values the citizens wish to enshrine in their country and if the democracy will be either consensual or majoritarian in nature, thus profoundly impacting how policy is made (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 220). Choosing presidentialism entails that a country is choosing decisive policy-making and a swift government response over having a society that is truly representative (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 220). This tradeoff between representativeness and governability is the main dichotomy scholars have examined; this tradeoff has meant that presidentialism receives high praise in terms of being able to respond decisively in crisis events (Lijphart, 1991, p. 82). However, whether this decisiveness is an advantage in a new democracy is dubious, as it usually entails having a majoritarian system that endows the executive both with significant powers and a competing mandate (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450).
Essentially, what this means is that because both the legislature and executives are elected by the people, they both claim to be for the people. Therefore, these claims are not conducive to coalition-building and overall governmental stability (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450). While not as much of an issue in established democracies, in new democracies, this majoritarian executive-legislative dynamic can undermine any democratic institutions that have not had the chance to consolidate whereby potentially excluding minority interests from government (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 450). In a new democracy with little institutions or entrenched institutions with authoritarian traits, a presidential system is very dangerous to put into place with the potential for an executive to accumulate through electoral mandate legislative or judicial powers (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 452). In general, presidential systems work out better in countries with relatively small and homogenous populations, which may not be the case in new democracies with territorial borders assigned during periods of colonization that have put diverse groups together arbitrarily in such a way as to increase the potential for destabilizing conflict (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 457).
Another reason to hesitate when instituting a presidential system is the fixed terms aspect, designed to promote accountability to voters and a check on executive power in a way that entails separation of powers in a system not as interdependent as the fused-powers system in parliamentarism (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). While some scholars have argued that fixed terms rigidity could be addressed through the calling of early elections in terms of policy continuity and stability, parliamentary systems retain an advantage in this area also with the “vote of no confidence” mechanism and the fused power nature of the system (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 453). Because the prime minister and legislature are mutually dependent on each other, in order to ensure majority support in parliament for policy coalition-building is a necessary prerequisite (Lijphart, 1991, p.73). This differs considerably from a presidential system that entails policymaking efficiency through the fact that the president with an electoral mandate can count on a single party cabinet and the limited coalition-building required of the executive in a majority party legislature (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73).
Thus, this vote mechanism provides an accountability safety valve for a parliamentary system in which there may be no fixed terms when coalitions fail to advance or cooperate on policy matters (Lijphart, 1991, p. 102). While this may prove more detrimental to a new democracy if the governing coalitions reach an impasse, the system can be amended to provide for immediate elections of a new prime minister and legislature, which is not usually possible in a presidential system even in a situation of executive-legislative deadlock due to fixed terms (Lijphart, 1991, p. 102). In other words, a vote of no confidence provides greater stability and policy continuity without the rigidity of fixed terms, while still retaining a mechanism that provides for voter accountability of the government when the coalition fails to deliver for its constituents (Lijphart, 1991, p. 102). In summation, parliamentarism has an advantage over presidentialism in ensuring governmental flexibility, relative political and policy stability and coalition-building as a necessity (Lijphart, 1991, p. 101-103). Tellingly, Mainwaring & Shugart (1997) note most “long-established democracies” are parliamentary (p. 169).
The choice of a presidential or parliamentary system not only impacts the democratic values that will be central to society (consensual versus majoritarian), but also the electoral laws that shape the party system (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 231). Like the choice of a presidential or parliamentary government, the choice of electoral system is often context specific, entailing greater advantages or disadvantages for the quality of democracy (Lijphart, 2004, p. 107). Party systems are vital, as they are the vehicles through which segments of society can effectively mobilize their policy positions (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 223). Therefore, an institutional engineer has two choices of electoral system: plurality or proportionality (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). In turn, these two systems tend to promote a two-party or multi-party system that tend to exhibit the broader characteristics of either a presidential or parliamentary system (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). Whereas a plurality system is one in which the candidate that wins the most votes in a single member district (SMD) wins a seat in the legislature, a proportional system (PR) of representation entails multi-member districts (MMD) and greater district representation in the legislature (Lijphart, 1991, p. 72-73). New democracies tend to have established party systems (usually autocratic), although some democracies are created without institutionalized party systems, meaning parties can shift dramatically. Thus, non-institutionalization of parties can be potentially destabilizing (Haerpfer, et al., 2009, p. 223). It is with this fact in mind that I recommend instituting a PR and MMD system to promote both the minority representation often lacking in a SMD plurality system and the ability to develop strong, multi-party rather than two party systems (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73-75).
Again, in a small country with a homogeneous population, a SMD plurality system would function optimally in its provision of a two-party system that favors more moderate larger parties (those able to garner a broader constituency than a minority party) and the relative efficiency of majoritarian decision-making resulting from a moderate coalition (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73; Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 457, 465). However, in a new democracy, minority representation could be prized more due to the greater emphasis on consensus in a formerly autocratic society (Lijphart, 1991, p. 73). Thus, a PR MMD system can be optimized to ensure that in districts with high numbers of representatives that the resulting multi-party legislature does not result in destabilizing deadlock and ideological polarization while allowing for policy formulation through the formation of governing coalitions (Lijphart, 1991, p. Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997, p. 465). This can be done through a threshold mechanism, in which a party is required to acquire a certain percentage of the vote to gain seats in the legislature and preventing extremist parties from harming the ability of moderate governing coalitions to form. This allows for a preservation of quality of democracy through representativeness while still retaining a measure that prevents harmful gridlock among the parties.
In conclusion, while both presidentialism and parliamentarism and their accompanying governmental systems have distinct advantages and disadvantages, the latter are largely dependent on context . Therefore, to engender a viable democracy with both greater quality of democracy through representativeness and the capacity to govern, a modified parliamentary system with a PR electoral system is optimal for new democracies (Lijphart, 2004, p. 83). In balancing these characteristics, countries can thus ensure for viable democracies in promoting consensus and minimizing the harmful adversarial tendencies of governing found in both presidential and parliamentary systems (Lijphart, 2004, p. 83).
Works Cited:
Haerpfer, et al. (2009). Democratization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lijphart, Arend. (1991). "Constitutional Choices for New Democracies." Journal of Democracy, 2(1), pp. 72-84.
Lijphart, Arend. (2004). Constitutional Design for Divided Societies. Journal of Democracy, 15(2), pp. 96-109.
Mainwaring, S., & Shugart, M. (1997). Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal. Comparative Politics, 29(4), pp. 449-471.
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